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L Introduction
Courts use the minimum contacts test to determine whether the Consti-
tution limits their ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants.' The test allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction when
1. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (adopting
minimum contacts test); infra Part MII (describing minimum contacts test).
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the defendant possesses "certain minimum contacts" such that subjecting
the defendant to personal jurisdiction "does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' ,,2 When the Supreme Court adopted the
minimum contacts test, it refused to exhaustively define either minimum
contacts or traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.3 This
decision made the minimum contacts test a flexible standard rather than
a rigid rule;4 the Court explained that "[w]hether due process is satisfied
must depend.., upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the Due Process Clause to insure. "s The test's flexibility gives courts the
ability to fit new contacts and new combinations of contacts within the
minimum contacts test's framework.6 Recently, federal and state courts
have been called upon to use the flexibility inherent within the minimum
contacts test to recognize a new genre of contacts: contacts arising from the
use of the Internet's World Wide Web for advertising.7 Several courts have
2. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
3. See id. at 319 (refusing to explicitly define minimum contacts). In International
Shoe, the Court wrote: "It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which
do not cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative." Id.
4. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (explaining evolution of due
process limits on personal jurisdiction).
5. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
6. See David C. Tunick, Up Close and Personal: A Close-Up Look at Personal
Jurisdiction, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1157, 1219-25 (1996) (describing types of contacts
recognized by Supreme Court as sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction).
7. See Lori Irish Bauman, Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Advertising, 14 COM-
PUTER LAw., Jan. 1997, at 2-4 (discussing calls to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresident World Wide Web advertisers); Dale M. Cendali & James D. Arbogast, Net Use
Raises Issues ofJurisdiction, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C7 (discussing personal jurisdic-
tion issues raised by Internet and CompuServe network use).
The calls to recognize World Wide Web advertising contacts are supplemented by calls to
recognize all manner of other computer network contacts, including World Wide Web
contacts, e-mail contacts, and various other electronic contacts. See Agency Rent A Car
System, Inc. v. Grand Rent A Car Corp., 98 F.3d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding minimum
contacts based in part on use of computer network reservation system located in forum);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1996) (allowing exercise of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident based in part on contacts made over CompuServe's
computer network); Resuscitation Tech., Inc. v. Continental Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-
1457-C-M/S, 1997 WL 148567, at *2-4 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997) *(finding e-mail messages
sent from forum one basis for finding minimum contacts); Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43,
47 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding minimum contacts arising in part from e-mail messages sent to
forum); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-27 (W.D. Pa.
1271
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269 (1997)
obliged,' while other courts have refused.9 This split creates uncertainty for
1997) (finding minimum contacts established by World Wide Web site operator who used
World Wide Web page to solicit subscribers to its news and information service and who used
Internet to process applications); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F.
Supp. 413, 417-22 (D. Ariz. 1996) (finding minimum contacts arising from use of electronic
mail, CompuServe, and World Wide Web); Naxos Resources Ltd. v. Southam, Inc., No. CV
96-2314 WJR (MCX), 1996 WL 662451, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1996) (finding insuffi-
cient contacts based on electronic dissemination of newspaper articles via Internet, LEXIS,
and Westlaw); St. Martin & Mahoney, P.L.C. v. Patton, 863 F. Supp. 311, 313-15 (E.D. La.
1994) (finding insufficient contacts arising from advertisement in national magazine/computer
network); PLUS System, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111, 118-19 (D.
Colo. 1992) (giving weight in minimum contacts analysis to use of Colorado-based automated
teller machine (ATM) network); California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631
F. Supp. 1356, 1361-64 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding minimum contacts based, in part, on
defamatory statements transmitted via interstate computer network); Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 399, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding use of e-mail and telephone may establish
minimum contacts over foreign defendant in California); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct
Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding insufficient contacts
arising from connection to and use of computer network located in forum).
8. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(finding minimum contacts arising from defendant's World Wide Web advertising activities);
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding
minimum contacts based, in part, on defendant's Internet (World Wide Web) advertising);
State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at "6-11 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (finding minimum contacts arising from defendant's World Wide Web
advertising activities), aft'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997);
see also Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, *2-5 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 6, 1997) (finding minimum contacts based on defendant's copying and posting of plain-
tiff's World Wide Web site, but refusing on reasonableness grounds to exercise jurisdiction);
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Alta Vista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997)
(noting defendant's World Wide Web activities brought defendant over jurisdictional line);
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-25 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(noting World Wide Web activities can create contacts with forum); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes
Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (weighing defendant's World Wide Web advertising
contacts in favor of minimum contacts finding).
9. See Weber v. Jolly Hotels, No. CIV. A. 96-2582, 1997 WL 574950, at *5-6
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1997) (refusing to exercise general jurisdiction over World Wide Web
advertiser); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(refusing to recognize World Wide Web site as contact sufficient to support exercise of general
jurisdiction); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing World Wide Web contact as insufficient to support personal jurisdiction), aft'd,
No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc.,
No. Civ. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (stating that recognition
of web site as sufficient minimum contact for general jurisdiction would "eviscerate" personal
jurisdiction requirement); see also Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Medical Prods., Inc., No.
96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232, at *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 1997) (refusing to exercise
personal jurisdiction over defendant who provided "information" over World Wide Web);
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *21
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advertisers who want to avail themselves of the World Wide Web's opportu-
nities, while still structuring "their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.10
Although the World Wide Web offers advertisers tremendous economic
opportunities, exposure to lawsuits in distant forums raises the costs of doing
business on the World Wide Web." This Note explores the constitutional
limits to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident World Wide
Web advertisers. It argues that while World Wide Web advertising can
establish sufficient contacts to satisfy the minimum contacts test, 12 the Due
Process Clause13 requires courts to exercise restraint in their attempts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants based on the
defendants' World Wide Web advertising activities. 4 This Note also dis-
cusses the current risks faced by advertisers because of improper application
of the minimum contacts test in several World Wide Web advertising cases.1 s
Although a court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction depends on
both state and federal law,16 this Note focuses on the constitutional limits to
personal jurisdiction in World Wide Web advertising cases.' 7 This Note
does not address whether or when state long-arm statutes allow the exercise
of personal jurisdiction based on World Wide Web advertising activities.' 8
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (mag. j. report and recommendation) (recommending court refuse
to exercise personal jurisdiction over World Wide Web advertiser).
10. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
11. See Bauman, supra note 7, at 2-4 (describing economic opportunities and legal risks
of Internet advertising).
12. See infra Part IV.C (suggesting proper standard for measuring World Wide Web
advertising contacts).
13. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
14. See infra Parts III-V (describing minimum contacts test and its application to World
Wide Web advertising contacts).
15. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing recent applications of minimum contacts test in World
Wide Web advertising cases).
16. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CrVILACTIONS § 1.0112][a], at 1-7 to -9
(2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1996) (describing bases and limits of in personam jurisdiction).
Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's ability to render a valid and enforceable judgment
against a defendant. Id.
17. See infra Part IMI (describing constitutional foundations of minimum contacts analysis).
18. See 1 CAsAD, supra note 16, § 1.01[2][a], at 1-8 to -9 (describing long-arm stat-
utes). Long-arm statutes define the bases state courts may use when attempting to exercise
personal jurisdiction over defendants not found within the forum. Id. Federal courts exercise
jurisdiction according to the long-arm statute of the state in which they sit, except in special,
Congressionally defined, situations. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) Oinking federal court long-arm
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In addition, it avoids extensive discussion of World Wide Web-related cases
where other contacts predominate over the defendant's World Wide Web
advertising contacts, or otherwise significantly influence the court's mini-
mum contacts analysis.19
The Note begins, in Part H, with a description of the World Wide Web
and World Wide Web advertising practices and methods. Part III discusses
the constitutional standards for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Part IV
criticizes current approaches used to measure purposeful minimum contacts
in World Wide Web advertising cases and encourages courts to adopt a new
standard that recognizes the great variety of World Wide Web advertise-
ments and advertisers. Part V discusses whether and when fairness and
reasonableness concerns may be used successfully to limit the reach of long-
arm jurisdiction over World Wide Web advertisers. The Note concludes, in
Part VI, with final notes on the importance of exercising care in evaluating
World Wide Web advertising contacts.
jurisdiction to state long-arm statutes). See generally 1 CASAD, supra note 16, §§ 5.02-.03
(describing federal long-arm jurisdiction).
19. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997) (noting defendant's minimum contacts with forum including "a contract with a Massa-
chusetts corporation, reflecting an agreement to apply Massachusetts law, soliciting business
through its Web-site, including Massachusetts business, and three sales to Massachusetts resi-
dents, etc."); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-27 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (finding minimum contacts established by World Wide Web site operator who used
World Wide Web page to solicit subscribers to its news and information service and who used
Internet to process applications); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.
1996) (exercising jurisdiction based primarily on defendant's newspaper advertisement, but
noting importance of World Wide Web advertisement); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v.
BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 417-22 (D. Ariz. 1996) (finding minimum contacts
arising from use of electronic mail, CompuServe, and World Wide Web). Several commenta-
tors have considered the jurisdictional effect of various World Wide Web contacts, including
non-advertising World Wide Web contacts. See generally Corey B. Ackerman, Note, World-
Wide Volkswagen, Meet the World Wide Web: An Examination of Personal Jurisdiction
Applied to a New World, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 403 (1997) (analyzing World Wide Web
personal jurisdiction cases); Lea Hall, Comment, The Evolving Law of Personal Jurisdiction
for Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 66 Miss. L.J. 457 (1996) (same); Gwenn M.
Kalow, Note, From the Internet to Court: Exercising Jurisdiction over World Wide Web
Communications, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2241 (1997) (same); Ira S. Nathenson, Comment,
Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over
Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 911 (1997) (same); David L.
Stott, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Constitutional Boundary of
Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819
(1997) (same); Leif Swedlow, Note, Three Paradigms of Presence: A Solution for Personal
Jurisdiction on the Internet, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 337 (1997) (same); David Thatch,
Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the World-Wide Web: Bits (and Bytes) of Minimum Contacts,
23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143 (1997) (same).
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IL. The World Wide Web and World Wide Web Advertising Practices
The Supreme Court's decision to adopt a flexible minimum contacts test
made the minimum contacts analysis a fact-sensitive inquiry.' ° A court must
understand the quality and nature of a defendant's activities before it begins
the minimum contacts analysis.2" Unfortunately, the relative legal novelty
of the Internet, the World Wide Web, and other computer networks has
frustrated consistent application of the minimum contacts test to these new
contacts and has led to factual errors.' Constitutional application of the
minimum contacts test in World Wide Web advertising cases demands a
deeper understanding of the World Wide Web and of World Wide Web
advertising practices and methods.
A. The World Wide Web: Frequently (Un)Asked Questions
Discussion of the World Wide Web must begin with discussion of the
World Wide Web's host, the Internet.' The Internet is the world's largest
20. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (describing flexibility
of minimum contacts test).
21. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (noting that
application of minimum contacts test varies with quality and nature of defendant's contacts).
22. See Dominic Bencivenga, Cyberspace in Court: Arguments Are Part Tradition, Part
Imagination, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1996, at 5 (describing difficulty in applying old theories to
new contacts); see also Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048, at
*2 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997) (explaining that "attempting to apply established trademark law
in the fast-developing world of the internet is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus").
Courts have experienced serious problems differentiating between contacts made on the Inter-
net and on other kinds of computer networks. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257, 1262, 1266 (6th Cir. 1996) (mischaracterizing Patterson's CompuServe contacts as
Internet contacts). In CompuServe, Patterson's contacts with Ohio occurred through the Compu-
Serve computer network. See id. at 1260-61 (describing Patterson's contacts with Ohio).
Patterson entered into contracts that specified Ohio law as the governing law. Id. at 1260.
He transmitted thirty-two computer software files to the CompuServe system in Ohio. Id. at
1261. He advertised and sold his software on CompuServe's Ohio-headquartered system. Id.
The court found purposeful availment through these and other contacts. Id. at 1266-68.
Despite the fact that Patterson did not actually contact CompuServe through the Internet,
the court found that "Patterson consciously reached out from Texas to Ohio... to market his
computer software on the Internet." Id. at 1266. The confusion in the court's minimum
contacts analysis likely arose because the computer software Patterson transmitted to Ohio and
stored on CompuServe's proprietary system was designed to assist in the use of the Internet.
Id. at 1261. Other courts have repeated the CompuServe court's error and have treated
CompuServe as an Internet case. See Zippo Mfg. Corp. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (mischaracterizing CompuServe as Internet case);
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same), af4'd,
No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
23. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining relationship
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computer network.u It uses a common communications protocolz2 to link
thousands of smaller computer networks and millions of individual comput-
ers around the world.' No single entity owns the Internet, and its global
reach and internal complexity continue to frustrate efforts to control its use
and its users.'
between Internet and World Wide Web), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). See generally KATm
HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
INTERNET (1996) (recounting Internet's history); HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE
INTERNET COMPLETE REFEENCE (1994) (providing detailed description of Internet); ED KROL
& PAULA FERGUSON, THE WHOLE INTERNET FOR WINDOWS 95: USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG
(1995) (providing description of Internet and World Wide Web); RAYMOND T. NimMER,
INFORMATION LAW (1996) (describing information industry); HENRY R. PERRITT, JR., LAW
AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY (1996 & Supp. 1997) (discussing legal aspects of
National Information Infrastructure); Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 U. CONN.
L. REV. 1095 (1996) (describing Internet's technical operation).
24. See MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202,203 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describ-
ing Internet as world's largest computer network).
25. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing communica-
tions protocols), af4'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). A communications protocol consists of a set
of rules for addressing information and transmitting that information across a computer net-
work. Id. In theory, these rules differ little from the rules used by the United States Postal
Service for addressing envelopes and delivering them to their destinations. See KROL &
FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 26-31 (comparing Internet protocols to procedures used by
United States Postal Service).
26. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831 (estimating 9.4 million computers are linked to
Internet, not including millions of personal computers linked through telephone lines).
27. See id. at 831 (describing Internet as international computer network). The ACLU
court noted that the Internet exists largely as a matter of international consensus rather than
government edict, stating: "It exists and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of
thousands of separate operators of computers and computer networks independently decided
to use common data transfer protocols to exchange communications and information with other
computers .... " Id. at 832; see also Burk, supra note 23, at 1109-15 (describing Internet's
technical complexity); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-76 (1996) (describing difficulties surrounding
certain Internet regulatory efforts). Despite the difficulties, national, state, and local govern-
ments are attempting to regulate Internet users, restrict Internet content, and control Internet
commerce. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1095-96 (describing Internet regulation);.Arny Kroll,
Comment, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet, 4 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 275, 279-98 (1996) (describing international Internet regulatory efforts); Christo-
pher Wolf & Scott Shorr, Cybercops Are Cracking Down on Internet Fraud, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
13, 1997, at B12 (describing federal and state efforts to control Internet commerce); DOT
Fines Virgin over Internet Advertising, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995, at B8 (describing fine
levied for allegedly misleading World Wide Web advertisement). These regulatory efforts
have drawn criticism from numerous scholars. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1095-96 (high-
lighting concerns raised by state and national regulatory attempts); Johnson & Post, supra, at
1367 (calling for new laws and regulations designed specifically for "Cyberspace"); Joel R.
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The Internet's diversity complicates jurisdictional analysis because its
uses and its users differ greatly. There are multiple ways to access the
network,' multiple owners of its component parts,29 and multiple ways to
transmit and receive information across the network.30 Typical uses and
applications include electronic mail (e-mail), 31 mailing lists and news-
groups,32 and remote control of other computers.33
The variety of potential users and potential Internet contacts makes it
difficult to analogize between different cases and requires courts to look
Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 912
(1996) (rejecting current regulatory approaches and calling for new network governance
paradigm).
28. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832-33 (describing Internet access from places ranging
from businesses and universities to homes and coffee shops).
29. Id. at 832.
30. See id. at 834-36 (describing methods of communicating over Internet).
31. See EDIAS Software Int'l, Inc. v. BASIS Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (describing electronic mail). "E-mail is, simply, electronic mail. Users have
computer addresses to which messages can be sent. Thus, e-mail does not differ substantially
from other recognizable forms of communication, such as traditional mail or phone calls,
where one person has an address or phone number to reach another person." Id. (footnote
omitted). However, e-mail accounts do not always reveal the user's location and sending e-
mail is not necessarily equivalent to sending a letter to a known address or dialing a phone
number. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1111-15 (describing Internet's geographical indetermi-
nacy). Indeed, where the ultimate destination is unknown, sending an e-mail message seems
more closely analogous to dialing a toll-free telephone number that gives no geographical clues
to the location of the number's owner and operator. C. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
845 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting "[a]n e-mail address provides no authoritative information about
the addressee, who may use an e-mail 'alias' or an anonymous remailer"), aftd, 117 S. Ct.
2329 (1997).
32. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834 (describing mailing lists and newsgroups). A
mailing list (listserv) allows users to send e-mail messages that are automatically forwarded
to all people who subscribe to the mailing list. Id. Mailing lists allow members to receive
frequent updates on current developments in both generalized and specialized fields. Id.
Newsgroups also allow communication with multiple people. Id. Newsgroup messages are
stored in a computer database which can be accessed by the user at anytime. Id. Although
mailing list messages are automatically sent to addresses on the list, newsgroup messages must
be accessed by the user. Id. These newsgroups may or may not be edited or moderated. Id.;
see KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 100-106 (describing mailing lists); id. at 175-84
(describing newsgroups).
33. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (describing remote access to computer resources
through computer program Telnet). Remote computer access is an important feature of the
Internet because it allows researchers and students scattered around the world to share very
expensive computer resources. See KRoL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 15 (describing
resource sharing); see also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 23, at 156 (describing Telnet's 1969
origins).
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269 (1997)
closely at the circumstances of each particular case.' For example, sending
an e-mail message to an individual and sending an e-mail message to a
mailing list involve nearly identical actions. The writer composes the
message on her computer, addresses the message, and sends it to its destina-
tion.36 However, these superficial similarities mask a deeper difference.
When a person sends an e-mail message to an individual, the sender intends
it to reach a single person.3 1 When a person sends e-mail to a mailing list,
the sender intends it to reach every user on that mailing list.38 This means
that a message sent to a mailing list may reach dozens of states and countries
within seconds or minutes and potentially establishes contacts with each of
those forums.3 9 These differences matter. A court weighing an e-mail
contact may be inclined to adopt a minimum contacts analysis similar to an
analysis of contacts made when a nonresident sends a letter to the forum
through the postal system.40 In contrast, a court weighing mailing list
contacts may find a closer analogy to contacts made through publication or
mass mailings.4' Although a discussion of the array of potential contacts the
Internet allows is beyond the scope of this Note, other commentators have
begun to discuss the jurisdictional impact of these contacts.42
34. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (describing
fact-based nature of minimum contacts test). At least one court, in a case not involving issues
of personal jurisdiction, has taken the time to learn about the different uses of the Internet and
the differences between the Internet and other types of computer networks, such as commercial
online services. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49 (giving detailed findings of fact concern-
ing Internet and other computer networks).
35. See KROL&FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 84-85, 101-04 (noting similarities between
sending messages to individuals and sending messages to mailing lists).
36. See id. (describing composition and transmission of e-mail).
37. See supra note 31 (describing e-mail).
38. See supra note 32 (describing mailing lists).
39. See KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 101-02 (describing mailing list member-
ship).
40. See TSA, Inc. v. Nass, No. Civ. A. 96-4509, 1997 WL 47612, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
4, 1997) (describing various courts' handling of letters - and telephone calls - in minimum
contacts analysis); see also EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp.
413, 419 (D. Ariz. 1996) (describing similarities between e-mail and traditional forms of
communication such as telephones and postal system). But see Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (explaining differences between e-mail and
regular mail).
41. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-81 (1984) (exercising
personal jurisdiction over publisher who sold magazines in forum); Gordon v. ITT Corp., 273
F. Supp. 164, 166-68 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (exercising personal jurisdiction over corporations who
directed mass solicitations at forum residents).
42. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1109-11 (describing Internet commerce and virtual
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Cases involving World Wide Web advertising require courts to under-
stand the World Wide Web's unique nature and special features.43 The
World Wide Web functions as an information storage and retrieval system
for the Internet. 4 Two parties give the World Wide Web life: publishers and
users. 45 World Wide Web publishers create Web pages and place those
pages on World Wide Web sites.' The pages usually contain text and may
also contain graphics, pictures, and links47 to other World Wide Web pages,
sound or video files, computer programs, and other data and information. 4s
contacts); Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework for
Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1083,
1126-32 (1996) (proposing standard for evaluating minimum contacts in libel cases involving
"cyberspace" contacts); Bruce W. Sanford & Michael L. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New
Tricks: The FirstAmendment in an Online World, 28 U. CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1165-70 (1996)
(discussing personal jurisdiction and choice of law issues related to online First Amendment
issues); Kalow, supra note 19, at 2256-66 (discussing standards for exercising jurisdiction
based on World Wide Web advertising contacts); Swedlow, supra note 19, at 384-89 (suggest-
ing model rule for various electronic contacts).
43. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing World
Wide Web), af4'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 117-71
(same).
44. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 836-38 (describing information retrieval and search
capabilities of World Wide Web). The World Wide Web is but one of the many ways
information retrieval and searching occurs on the Internet. Id. For example, the File Transfer
Protocol (FTP) allows Internet users to transfer computer files from a remote computer to the
user's computer. Id. at 835. In addition, the Gopher system allows individuals to search
remote computers for information. Id. at 835-36; see also HAHN & STOUT, supra note 23,
at 297-359, 429-457 (1994) (describing various methods for searching for and retrieving
information from Internet).
45. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2335-36 (1997) (discussing publisher and user
World Wide Web perspectives). The Supreme Court explained that for publishers the World
Wide Web "constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide
audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers." Id. at 2335. From the
user's perspective, the Supreme Court found that the World Wide Web is comparable "to both
a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling
mall offering goods and services." Id,
46. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (describing World Wide Web publishers). World
Wide Web pages provide the World Wide Web's basic content. Id. World Wide Web sites,
which consist of World Wide Web pages and other information and programs, are stored on
computers connected to the Internet. See MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing World Wide Web sites).
47. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 836-37 (describing links). Hypertext links allow users
viewing a World Wide Web page to access other documents and files noted by the page's
author. Id.
48. See id. (describing information retrieval and navigation aspects of World Wide
Web); see also KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 117-18 (describing World Wide Web's
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World Wide Web users connect to the Internet and use a computer program,
called a browser, to navigate the World Wide Web and access its contents.49
Information retrieval occurs through two basic methods. The user can either
enter the address of the World Wide Web site she wants to access,50 or if she
is already viewing a World Wide Web page, that page may contain links she
can select to access other sources of information.51
The World Wide Web's creator originally designed the World Wide
Web to allow members of the international scientific community to share
information and research results stored on computers located around the
world.52 Although the World Wide Web retains this basic information
sharing and retrieval function, it has acquired other attributes as well.53 In
particular, it has become an advertising medium.?' Many commercial World
Wide Web sites contain few or no links to other sites and serve as little more
than continuous advertisements.55 In addition, commercial advertising
basic operation).
49. See KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 118-19 (discussing function and operation
of World Wide Web browsers).
50. See MTVNetworks, 867 F. Supp. at 203 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing Internet
addresses). Internet and World Wide Web addresses come in two forms. The first form is
a numeric address, similar to a telephone number, that identifies the particular computer
linked to the network. Id. The second form also identifies the particular computer linked to
the network. Id. However, this second form is alphanumeric and easier for the user to
remember (or to guess). Id. An example is "www.wlu.edu." A computer user who enters
this address accesses the World Wide Web home page that belongs to Washington & Lee
University in Lexington, Virginia. Washington & Lee University (visited Sept. 8, 1997)
<http://www.wlu.edu>.
51. See KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 117-53 (describing use of World Wide
Web browsers, including navigation and information retrieval methods).
52. See Herb Brody, The Web Maestro: An Interview with Tim Berners-Lee, TECH.
REv., July 1996, at 33, 33-34 (discussing World Wide Web's origins).
53. See Elizabeth Corcoran, On the Internet, a Worldwide Information Explosion Beyond
Words, WASH. POST, June 30, 1996, at Al (describing World Wide Web's content).
Corcoran summarizes the World Wide Web's popular image and current nature:
Today tens of millions of people are tapping into it and thousands more are initi-
ated every day. A cross-section of the human experience, good and bad, is
swirling around the Web and other conduits of the on-line dimension known as
cyberspace: religious texts, blackjack games, art exhibits, political manifestos,
theater timetables, love letters, ads, wanted posters, scientific treatises, drafts of
first novels, peep shows.
Id.
54. See Mark Evans, WWW.DAD.WORRIED: World Wide Web Creator Tim Berners-
Lee Disappointed by Use of the Internet, FIN. POST, Apr. 30, 1996, at 11 (describing concerns
about co-opting of World Wide Web for commercial gain).
55. See id. (describing structure of commercial World Wide Web sites); Bart Ziegler,
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supports many of the most popular World Wide Web sites 6 Estimates of
current and projected spending indicate that World Wide Web advertising
will fuel much of the World Wide Web's future growth.57
B. World Wide Web Advertising: Practices and Methods
World Wide Web advertising comes in many different forms that affect
application of the minimum contacts test. All World Wide Web advertisers
begin with a basic site that contains one or more pages.5 The site and its
pages may also contain a wide variety of features including text, graphics,
sound, and video. 9 The basic World Wide Web site normally contains
information about the advertiser and the advertiser's products and services.'
Although the basic World Wide Web site is normally accessible to all World
Wide Web users,61 many advertisers attempt to increase the effectiveness and
On-Line: In Cyberspace the Web Delivers Junk Mail, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1995, at BI
(describing commercialization of World Wide Web); see also Cathy Taylor, Coca-Cola Finds
Its Way to the Internet, ADWEEK, Apr. 24, 1995, at 9, 9 (describing Coca-Cola's World Wide
Web site).
56. See Patrick M. Reilly, More Publishers Charging for Web Services, WALL ST. J.,
May 8, 1996, at B8 (describing advertising on World Wide Web sites).
57. See Lisa Bransten, Oanges to Intel's Co-Op Program Could Boost Web Advertising
40%, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1997, at B7 (noting growth of World Wide Web advertising,
estimated at $400 million for 1997); Internet Advertising Grows, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1996,
at B7 (reporting third quarter World Wide Web advertising spending at $75.6 million, up 46%
from second quarter); Megan Schnabel, Companies Spending Big on the Net, ROANOKE TIMES
& WORLD NEWS, Aug. 18, 1996, at 1 (discussing advertising spending by major corporations
such as IBM and Microsoft); Cathy Taylor, After the Year of the Web, ADWEEK, Jan. 15,
1996, at 27, 27-30 (discussing current and future strategies for World Wide Web advertising).
58. See Jill H. Ellsworth, Staking a Claim on the Internet, NATION's Bus., Jan. 1, 1996,
at 29, 29-30 (describing World Wide Web advertising).
59. Id.; see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 924, 836-37 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing
features of World Wide Web), aft'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). Many commercial web sites
contain features that go well beyond mere advertising. Many sites provide Web users with
the option to contact the advertiser directly through e-mail and some even give Web users the
opportunity to order products and services online. See David Shaw, Internet Gold Rush
Hasn't Panned Out Yet for Most, L.A. TIMEs, June 19, 1997, at Al (discussing Internet
marketing). These extra features can create additional contacts between the advertiser and the
forum that affect the personal jurisdiction analysis. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-25 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (describing different levels of commercial
activity on Internet).
60. See Ellsworth, supra note 58, at 30-31 (describing several typical World Wide Web
advertisements).
61. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing defendant's "general access" World Wide Web site), af4'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL
560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
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impact of their advertisements by promoting, targeting, and tailoring their
advertisements.
1. Promotion and Targeting of World Wide Web Advertisements
A World Wide Web advertisement does an advertiser little good unless
consumers can find the advertisement.62 Advertisers have a number of op-
tions to enhance the visibility and accessibility of their World Wide Web
sites. Many advertisers submit descriptions of their site to World Wide Web
search engines and indexes.63 Advertisers also incorporate their site's
address in their company letterhead or product packaging.' Some advertis-
ers integrate their World Wide Web site into an overall marketing strategy
and include the site's address in print, radio, and television advertising.65
Finally, some advertisers pay for advertising space, called banner advertis-
ing, on other World Wide Web sites.'
62. See Peter Coy et al., Has the Net Finally Reached the Wall?, Bus. WK., Aug. 26,
1996, at 62, 62-64 (describing Internet's tremendous growth and difficulty of locating infor-
mation); Edward R. Silverman, Doing Business on the Internet, NEWSDAY, Apr. 10, 1995,
at Cl (describing opportunities and problems facing businesses with World Wide Web sites).
63. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837 (describing search engines). Search engines are
services that routinely catalog the content of the Internet and the World Wide Web and that
allow users to search for information using key words. Id. Some services have also created
indexes similar to telephone directories. See KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 127-30
(describing indexes and search engines). Print directories of World Wide Web sites, including
advertising sites also exist. See generally HARLEY HAHN, THE INTERNET YELLow PAGES (3d
ed. 1996) (listing some Internet and World Wide Web content). Although many search
engines and directories automatically search the Internet and catalog its contents, submission
of the advertisement's address increases the likelihood of its inclusion. See How to Suggest
Your Site (visited Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www.yahoo.com/does/info/include.html> (pro-
viding information on suggesting World Wide Web sites for inclusion in Yahoo! directory).
64. See Internet Marketing: Six Great Ways to Promote a Web Site, ADVERTISING AGE,
May 27, 1996, at M6 (discussing World Wide Web site promotion).
65. See Shaw, supra note 59, at Al (discussing incorporation of Web site addresses into
traditional advertising media); see also Stuart Elliot, Advertising: I.B.M. 's Multimedia
Campaign Posits That Small Is Beautiful, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1997, at D6 (discussing
IBM's integrated advertising campaign involving print, television, and Internet). Indeed, even
companies such as Yahoo! and Lycos which derive operating revenues from advertising on
their World Wide Web sites advertise their own services in traditional media, such as tele-
vision. See Kim Cleland, Search Engines Weigh Impact of TV Campaigns, ADVERTISING
AGE, June 30, 1997, at 26 (discussing Yahoo!, Infoseek, Excite, and Lycos advertising
campaigns).
66. See Hillary Rosner, Growing Pains: Buying Ads on the Internet Shouldn't Be
Virtually Impossible, ADWEEK, July 8, 1996, at 10, 10-14 (discussing World Wide Web site
promotions). Banner advertisements are becoming increasingly important in World Wide Web
marketing. Id. Advertisers place the banner advertisements on Web sites such as ESPN's or
the New York imes's World Wide Web sites. See Reilly, supra note 56, at B8 (discussing
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Many advertisers refine their promotion by targeting specific markets.67
Demographic data collected from a variety of sources, including data col-
lected on the Internet, provide information that allows advertisers to target
specific markets. 68  These data also provide information concerning the
appropriate content and design of the advertiser's World Wide Web site and
effective methods and locations for promoting the site.69
World Wide Web advertising strategies). The banner advertisements are typically small, but
eye catching. If a user clicks on one of the banners with her computer mouse, the advertiser's
full page advertisement appears. Although banner advertisements are becoming more impor-
tant, there have been some growing pains. See Rosner, supra, at 12-14 (discussing difficulties
in placing and maintaining banner advertisements); see also Ad Pricing Stirs Internet Discus-
sion: Procter & Gamble to Pay Based on 'Click Through' Rate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 29, 1996, at 1D (discussing pricing models for World Wide Web banner ads).
67. See John M. Moran, Getting Sold on the Web: A 'Target' Aims at Advertising,
NEWSDAY, June 30, 1996, at A67 (discussing advertisers' ability to target particular markets);
see also Thomas E. Weber, Software Lets Marketers Target Web Ads, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
1997, at B1 (describing software designed to customize Internet advertising).
68. See Merrill Goozner, An Old Glow, and Dynamic Prospects: As Ways to Measure
Usage Are Developed, Internet's Potential for Advertising Grows, CHI. TRm., Dec. 16, 1996,
at 1 (discussing World Wide Web advertising). Advertisers' attempts to target their advertise-
ments follow long and established trends in the advertising industry. See VANCE PACKARD,
THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 158-66 (1957) (discussing efforts to target youth market); ARCH
G. WOODSIDE, MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IMAGE AND LINKAGE ADVERTISING 1-15
(1996) (discussing how advertising works); see also Andrew J. Zbaracki, Comment, Advertis-
ing Amenability: Can Advertising Create Amenability?, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 212, 230-34 (1994)
(describing traditional advertising practices including targeting). However, the World Wide
Web also possesses unique features that differentiate World Wide Web advertising from
traditional advertising, including the ability of small advertisers to reach large audiences at low
costs. See Pierre Berthon, et al., The World Wide Web as an Advertising Medium: Toward
an Understanding of Conversion Efficiency, J. ADVER. RESEARCH, Jan. 11, 1996, at 43, 43-44
(discussing unique features of World Wide Web marketing); Donna L. Hoffman & Thomas
P. Novak, Marketing in Hypermedia Computer-Mediated Environments: Conceptual Founda-
tions, J. MKTG., July 1996, at 50, 51 (discussing Internet as many-to-many form of communi-
cation rather than one-to-many form of communication).
Despite the positive qualities of World Wide Web advertising, current tools for targeting
specific markets still need improvement. Advertisers experience great difficulty targeting
specific geographic markets because the physical location of World Wide Web users often
remains hidden. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Internet's and World Wide Web's geo-
graphic insensitivity). In addition, current measuring tools need improvement. See Jane
Greenstein, Advertisers Still Trying to Get a Line on Net Users Marketing, L.A. TimS, Dec.
2, 1996, at D5 (discussing poor quality of current tracking tools). However, many organiza-
tions are working to improve their tracking abilities. See Laura Rich, Measure for Measure:
What Is the Web Worth?: Calculating the Value of On-Line Media, ADWEEK, Nov. 11, 1996,
at 32, 32 (discussing pricing models and initiative to track World Wide Web usage).
69. See Cathy Taylor, Interactive: Marketers Wise Up as Web Surges, ADWEEK, Sept.
9, 1996, at 14, 14-15 (discussing World Wide Web advertising strategies); Margot Williams,
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2. Tailoring of World Wide Web Advertisements
Some advertisers take promotion and targeting to an even higher level.
These advertisers actually tailor the content of their advertisement to the
preferences of individual World Wide Web users.7° Advertisers learn
information about individual users from World Wide Web site usage logs,
surveys, and registration forms.7 In addition, many advertisers use special
data files called "cookies" that they place on the users' computers to track
browsing habits.2 The information collected helps advertisers control the
Getting Caught in the Web by Aggressive Advertisers, WASH. POST., Apr. 1, 1996, at F16
(discussing use of site usage logs to target advertising).
70. See Weber, supra note 67, at B1 (describing software designed to target advertise-
ments).
71. See supra note 69 (discussing World Wide Web advertising methods and strategies).
72. See Lisa Bransten, Cookies Leave a Bitter Taste, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at 15
(describing cookies as marketing tools). Cookies, which were originally designed to stream-
line communications between a World Wide Web site and a World Wide Web browser, can
contain information about a user's computer, World Wide Web browsing habits, and other
personal information. Id.; see All Things Considered: 'Cookie' Tracks Net User's Visits to
Web Sites (National Public Radio broadcast, July 14, 1996) [hereinafter All Things Considered]
(discussing commercial exploitation of cookies); Williams, supra note 69, at F16 (describing
cookies). Cookies, like other World Wide Web targeting tools have limitations, including the
fact that they can only track usage of a particular computer, rather than usage by a particular
individual. See Gudmondsson et al., Commercialization of the World Wide Web: The Role of
Cookies (last modified Dec. 18, 1996) <http://www.2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.educb3/mgt565a/
group5/paper.group5.paper2.htm> (discussing limitations of cookies). In response to adver-
tisers' attempts to use cookies to track user activities, creative programmers have developed
programs that disable cookies or that remove the cookies from the user's computer. See John
Schwartz, Trail of Crumbs Leads Right to the Cyber-Cookie Jar, WASH. POST, June 24, 1996,
at F19 (noting existence of software that blocks cookies); see also ZDNet Tackles Web Cookie
Privacy Concerns with Introduction of Free 'CookieMaster' Sofiware Utility, PR NEWSWME,
Dec. 20, 1996, available in WESTLAW, PRW.IRB database (discussing computer program
that blocks cookies); Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Introduces PGPcookie.cutter for Private and
Anonymous Web Browsing, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 9, 1996, available in WESTLAW, BWIRE
database (describing program that blocks or filters cookies); John M. Moran, 'Cookie' Tracing
Files Raise Web Privacy Issues, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, June 14, 1997, at D4 (describing
"PGP cookie.cutter" program). PGP's program allows users to specify which World Wide
Web sites are allowed to create or access cookie files. Moran, supra, at D4; see also Joshua
Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 28, 32-33 (describing various ways
to block information collection). In addition, World Wide Web browsers such as Netscape's
Navigator and Microsoft's Internet Explorer provide users with the option to block cookies.
See Gudmondsson et al., supra (discussing responses to cookies and their perceived threat to
privacy). Several important players in the development of World Wide Web and Internet
standards, including Microsoft and Netscape, have proposed a new standard for protecting
users' privacy. See High-Tech Firms Develop Internet Privacy Standard, WASH. POST, May
27, 1997, at El (describing new information collection standard). This new Open Profiling
Standard would give users greater control over personal information sought by World Wide
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types of banner advertisements placed on other World Wide Web pages, and
it allows advertisers to alter their advertisements to provide information
specifically tailored to individual World Wide Web users.' The variety of
advertising techniques and the varying levels of technical sophistication
among World Wide Web advertisers complicates application of the minimum
contacts test to World Wide Web advertising contacts.74 Thus, a court needs
a clear understanding of the advertiser's contacts before it can effectively
(and constitutionally) apply the minimum contacts test to the advertiser's
World Wide Web activities.
III. Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction
The Due Process Clause75 protects individual liberty by prohibiting
unwarranted assertions of personal jurisdiction.76 The modem minimum
contacts test, which is used to determine whether an exercise of personal
jurisdiction satisfies due process, consists of two interrelated requirements.'
Web advertisers. Id.; see Don Clark, Rivals Microsoft and Netscape Team Up to Protect
Consumer Privacy on the Web, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1997, at B14 (describing Open Pro-
filing Standard).
73. See All Things Considered, supra note 72 (discussing commercial exploitation of
cookies).
74. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-25 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (describing different kinds of online contacts and different approaches to those
contacts); infra Part IV.C (suggesting proper approach for analyzing World Wide Web
advertising contacts).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878) Oinking due process and personal
jurisdiction); see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (estab-
lishing minimum contacts test for testing due process limits on exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion). The Supreme Court has described protection of individual liberty as the driving concern
behind the constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction. See Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) (rejecting federalism as main
concern of limits on personal jurisdiction); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
471-72 (1985) (describing Due Process Clause's protection of individual liberty rather than
federalism). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94
(1980) (noting importance of federalism in constitutional limits to personal jurisdiction).
Despite the Supreme Court's statements to the contrary, some scholars still argue that feder-
alism plays an important role in Supreme Court and lower court personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence. See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv. 689, 690 (1987) (remarking on central role of federalism
in personal jurisdiction decisions); see also Pamela J. Stephens, Sovereignty and Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine: Up the Stream of Commerce Without a Paddle, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
105, 133-34 (1991) (describing importance of sovereignty concerns in minimum contacts
analysis).
77. See Stephens, supra note 76, at 105-06 (describing modern two-step minimum con-
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First, the defendant must have purposefully created contacts with the forum,
and those contacts must rise to a level such that the defendant could reason-
ably expect to face lawsuits in the forum based on its contacts.78 Second, the
exercise of jurisdiction must be fair and reasonable,79
A. Minimum Contacts
The Supreme Court has called the purposeful minimum contacts re-
quirement "the constitutional touchstone" of the minimum contacts test.8°
The requirement prevents the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the
conduct of another, 8' and it prohibits the exercise of personal jurisdiction
based on random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.' Purposeful minimum
contacts exist in two general situations. A court can find that purposeful
minimum contacts exist if the defendant purposefully availed "itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." 3  Some examples of purposeful
availment include selling products in the forum,' selling magazines in the
forum," and contracting with forum residents.' A court can also find that
tacts test as unworkable).
78. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (describing
minimum purposeful contacts requirement).
79. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987) (applying
fairness and reasonableness considerations to invalidate exercise of personal jurisdiction); see
also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (describing fairness and reasonableness considerations).
80. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 (describing importance of purposeful minimum
contacts requirement).
81. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (rejecting minimum contact
created by unilateral action of third party).
82. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (describing limits to minimum contacts require-
ment) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
83. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (defining purposeful availment requirement).
84. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(explaining that regular sale of products in forum provides a reasonable basis for exercising
jurisdiction "if [defendant's] allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of
injury to its owner or others"). But see Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (1980) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion) (arguing "placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without
more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State").
85. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984) (finding
circulation of magazines in forum supports exercise of personal jurisdiction in libel action
based on contents of magazine).
86. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1985) (explaining that
defendant voluntarily assumed obligations connected to forum by entering long-term franchise
agreement with forum resident); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957) (finding due process satisfied when suit is based on contract which had substantial
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purposeful minimum contacts exist if the defendant directed its intentional
conduct toward the forum and that conduct had foreseeable harmful effects
in the forum state." Printing libelous statements about a forum resident in
a national publication satisfies this effects test.88 Although World Wide Web
advertisements may contain libelous statements or may otherwise involve
intentionally tortious conduct calculated to cause injury in the forum, 9 ordi-
narily World Wide Web advertisements will be evaluated under the purpose-
ful availment standard.' Accordingly, this Note focuses on discussion of the
appropriate standards for finding purposeful availment of a forum through
connection with forum).
87. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (holding that jurisdiction over
nonresidents was proper because of their intentional conduct calculated to cause injury in
California). In Calder, the Court found that the defendant's intentional and allegedly tortious
conduct directed at the forum made suit in the forum reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 790.
88. See id. (finding printing of libelous statements in National Enquirer established
purposeful contacts with target's home state, California).
89. See Counts & Martin, supra note 42, at 1126-30 (1996) (discussing standard for
exercising personal jurisdiction based on libelous statements made on Internet). Another
example of an Internet and World Wide Web related tort that allows use of the effects test is
"cybersquatting." See Panavision, Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 618-19 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (describing Toeppen's registration and ransoming of domain names such as "camden-
yards.com," "frenchopen.com," and "aircanada.com."). Cybersquatters register Internet
addresses containing trademarks or other highly suggestive names of corporations, events, and
products. Id. at 619. The cybersquatters then demand money to relinquish the names. Id.
In Panavision, the district court applied the effects test to find minimum contacts between the
forum (home of the plaintiff corporation) and the Illinois defendant who was ransoming two
domain names. Id. at 621-22; see Nathenson, supra note 19, at 945-46 (discussing grounds
for exercising jurisdiction over "squatters").
90. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(applying purposeful availment analysis), af4'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept.
10, 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(same); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(same); see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-26 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (noting that in cases involving commercial activity such as advertising, court's
ability to find purposeful availment and personal jurisdiction depends on "the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet"); infra Part IV
(discussing standards for finding purposeful availment in World wide Web advertising cases).
But see Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, at *2-3 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 1997) (finding minimum contacts based on tortious effects of defendant's
Internet-related conduct directed at forum); infra note 359 (discussing Expert Pages); Digital
Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 468-70 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding
"purposeful availment" existed because of "effect" of defendant's World Wide Web activities);
Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 54-58
(1997) <http://www.student.virginia.edu/-vjolt/voll/BURK.htm> (arguing CyberGoldcourt
applied Calder effects test in its minimum contacts analysis); infra note 196 (questioning Pro-
fessor Burk's interpretation of CyberGold).
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the World Wide Web.9" Regardless of the method of creating the contacts,
the Supreme Court requires a "substantial connection" between the defendant
and the forum before a court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdic-
tion.92
Part IV argues that World Wide Web advertisers can purposefully avail
themselves of a forum through the World Wide Web. 93 However, the mere
fact that a person puts an advertisement on the World Wide Web is insuffi-
cient to prove or disprove the existence of a substantial connection between
a forum and a defendant.' A court faced with a jurisdictional allegation
based on World Wide Web advertising contacts must conduct a fact-based
analysis of the defendant's intent and reasonable expectations to determine
whether the defendant fortuitously contacted the forum or whether the
defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum through the World Wide
Web.
95
Based on the level of contacts between the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation, a court may exercise two types of personal jurisdiction: gen-
eral jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.' General jurisdiction, which
allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over any claim brought against the
defendant, exists when the defendant's contacts with the forum are system-
atic and continuous.' Specific jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff's claim
91. See infra Part IV (describing current and proposed methods for finding purposeful
availment in World Wide Web advertising cases).
92. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (explaining need
for substantial connection between forum and defendant before finding purposeful minimum
contacts) (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
93. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that World Wide Web advertising contacts demonstrate
purposeful availment in some situations).
94. See infra Part IV.B. 1.c (describing defendant's mere awareness that World Wide
Web advertising reaches forum as insufficient to support constitutional exercise of personal
jurisdiction).
95. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(explaining that "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there"); infra Part IV.C (explaining
due process limits to finding substantial connections based on World Wide Web advertising).
96. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136-63 (1966) (defining general and specific
jurisdiction).
97. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15
(1984) (noting relationship or connection between claim and contact not required for personal
jurisdiction where defendant's forum related activities are continuous and systematic); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-49 (1952) (finding due process satisfied
by exercise of jurisdiction over claim unrelated to defendant's systematic and continuous
business activity in forum); see also Tunick, supra note 6, at 1199-1210 (describing general
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"arises from or relates to" the defendant's contacts with the forum.
98
No court has yet exercised general jurisdiction over a nonresident
World Wide Web advertiser and four factors make it unlikely that any court
will make the attempt. First, courts rarely exercise general jurisdiction."
Second, World Wide Web advertising does not create systematic and contin-
uous contacts. 1° Third, many courts have already refused to exercise
jurisdiction and contacts supporting its exercise).
98. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985) (describing arise
from or relate to requirement). Courts apply two different standards for the "arise from or
relate to requirement." See Mark M. Maloney, Note, Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the
"Arise from or Relate to" Requirement... What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1265, 1276-86 (1993) (describing different approaches to arise from or relate to requirement).
In Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, the Ninth Circuit applied a "but for" test to determine
whether the plaintiff's claim arose out of the defendant's contacts with the forum. Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499
U.S. 585 (1991), discussed in Maloney, supra, at 1278. In Shute, the Ninth Circuit found the
plaintiff's claim of personal injury, which resulted from a slip and fall on a cruise ship in
international waters off the coast of Mexico, sufficiently related to the defendant's "business
solicitation activities" in the forum and allowed the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the
forum. Shute, 897 F.2d at 382. Other courts apply a substantive-proximate cause test that
does not allow the exercise of jurisdiction in cases similar to Shute. See Pizarro v. Hoteles
Concorde Int'l, 907 F.2d 1256, 1259 (1st Cir. 1990) (refusing to exercise specific jurisdiction
based on slip and fall injury in Aruba, where defendant's only contacts with forum constituted
newspaper advertisements), discussed in Maloney, supra, at 1283-84; see also Flavio Rose,
Comment, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The "But For" Test, 82 CAL. L. REv.
1545, 1568-70 (1994) (describing "but for" causation analysis in personal jurisdiction cases);
Maloney, supra, at 1268-82 (describing application of "but for" and "substantive-proximate
cause" tests for specific personal jurisdiction). The substantive-proximate cause approach
requires direct legal relevance between the contract and the claim. See Maloney, supra, at
1282-83 (describing substantive-proximate cause test). Regardless of what test is used, a close
relationship between the contact and the claim increases the likelihood of finding personal
jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (describing minimum contacts
test's focus on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation"); see also
Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 236-37 (describing importance of relationship between claim and
contact in advertising cases). This Note does not consider whether the unique qualities of the
World Wide Web should influence the selection of either the substantive-proximate cause test
or the but-for test in the specific jurisdiction analysis. All of the specific jurisdiction World
Wide Web cases decided as of this writing have involved trademark or other claims substan-
tially related to the advertisement. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1127 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (noting trademark infringement claim arises in forum
where substantial amount of injury occurs); Maloney, supra, at 1282 (explaining substantial
relationship exists where contacts are proof of cause of action).
99. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
630-43 (1988) (noting that exercise of general jurisdiction has become rare).
100. See Weber v. Jolly Hotels, No. CIV. A. 96-2582, 1997 WL 574950, at *6 (D.NJ.
Sept. 12, 1997) (explaining Internet advertising does not create continuous and substantial
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general jurisdiction based on World Wide Web advertising contacts. 1
Finally, in most disputes involving World Wide Web advertising, courts will
be able to exercise specific jurisdiction."° Accordingly, this Note discusses
the constitutionality of attempts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
World Wide Web advertisers.
B. Fairness and Reasonableness Considerations
When the Supreme Court adopted the minimum contacts test in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,13 fairness was an integral part of the single
step minimum contacts test.'4 A court could exercise personal jurisdiction
contacts with forum); cf. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997) (explaining World
Wide Web sites are not as "invasive" as radio or television). In Reno, the Supreme Court
struck down two key provisions of the Communication Decency Act of 1996 that attempted
to regulate indecent and patently offensive speech. Id. at 2334. The Court placed great
weight on the District Court's conclusion that "[c]ommunications over the Internet do not
'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden." Id. at 2343
(quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)); see also Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting it requires several
affirmative steps to access World Wide Web advertisements), aff'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL
560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); Tunick, supra note 6, at 1199-1210 (describing high level
of contacts necessary for finding of continuous and systematic contacts).
101. See Weber, 1997 WL 574950, at *5-6 (refusing to exercise general jurisdiction over
World Wide Web advertiser); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258,
1268 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (refusing to recognize World Wide Web advertising as continuous and
systematic contact); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. Civ. 95-4037, 1996 WL
753991, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (refusing to exercise general jurisdiction based on
maintenance of World Wide Web site accessible from forum); see also Naxos Resources Ltd.
v. Southam, Inc., No. CV96-2314 WJR (MCX), 1996 WL 35387, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 3,
1996) (refusing to exercise general jurisdiction based on electronic dissemination of newspaper
articles via Internet, LEXIS, and Westlaw).
102. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(noting that litigation arose out of defendant's contacts with forum).
103. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
104. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (adopting mini-
mum contacts test). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court considered whether the Due
Process Clause allowed the exercise of jurisdiction over a corporation not "present" within the
forum. Id. at 315-16. Washington had sued International Shoe to recover unpaid contribu-
tions to the state's unemployment compensation fund. Id. at 311-12. International Shoe did
not maintain an office in Washington, did not execute sales contracts in the forum, and did not
keep any merchandise there. Id. at 313. However, International Shoe employed several
salesmen in the state. Id. International Shoe argued that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
violated due process because "its activities within the state were not sufficient to manifest its
'presence' there and that in its absence the state courts were without jurisdiction." Id. at 315.
The Supreme Court rejected the company's argument. Id. at 316. The Court explained that
traditional fictions such as corporate presence were unnecessary to establish personal jurisdic-
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so long as the defendant maintained sufficient minimum contacts such that
maintenance of the suit did not violate traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."10 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'°6 the
Supreme Court separated the fairness inquiry from the minimum contacts
analysis and transformed the International Shoe minimum contacts test into
a two-step inquiry. 7 The Supreme Court decided that once a court finds
tion, so long as the defendant established "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The Court found that
a corporation's exercise of the privilege of conducting activities within a forum "may give rise
to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." Id. at 319. The Court
noted that International Shoe's salesmen lived in Washington, worked within Washington, and
received commissions based on their sales in Washington. See id. at 313-14 (describing
International Shoe's contacts with Washington). Based on these and other contacts, the Court
found Washington's exercise of jurisdiction constitutional. Id. at 320. The Court also found
that the defendant had received sufficient notice of the suit and that Washington had the power
to levy a tax based on defendant's employment of salesmen in the forum. Id. at 320-21.
Justice Black concurred on different grounds in a separate opinion. Id. at 322 (Black, J.,
concurring). He argued that Washington had the power to levy the tax in question by virtue
of congressional consent and prior court decisions. Id. In addition, he argued against adop-
ting broad rules concerning due process. Id. Justice Black cautioned that ultimately the
Court's decisioncould be used to restrict state or federal power on the ground that "it does
not conform to this Court's idea of natural justice." Id. at 326.
105. See id. at 316 (adopting minimum contacts test).
106. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
107. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980) (adding
fairness and reasonableness analysis to International Shoe minimum contacts test). In World-
Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court considered whether the Oklahoma courts could exercise
personal jurisdiction over a New York car dealer (Seaway) and a regional distributor incorpo-
rated in New York (World-Wide Volkswagen) based on contacts proximately created by the
car buyer. Id. at 288-89. The plaintiffs purchased a car in New York. Id. at 288. The car
exploded after a collision in Oklahoma. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the car's presence in
Oklahoma was a foreseeable consequence of selling automobiles and that the accident created
sufficient contacts between the defendants and the forum. Id. at 295. However, the Court
explained that although the plaintiffs' unilateral action in taking the car to Oklahoma was
foreseeable, that unilateral action and the accident were insufficient to create minimum
contacts between the defendants and the forum. Id. at 298 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1957)). The Court found "no 'contacts, ties, or relations'" sufficient to subject
the defendants to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma. Id. at 299 (quoting International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 319). In the course of its opinion, the Court also noted that in addition to
determining whether the minimum contacts test allows the exercise of jurisdiction, a court
should also determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable. Id.
at 292; see infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (describing Worid-Vide Volkswagen
fairness and reasonableness factors).
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that minimum contacts exist, that court must then consider five fairness and
reasonableness considerations that may affect its ability to exercise personal
jurisdiction.08 According to the Court, these considerations include "the
burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,
the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in further-
ing fundamental substantive social policies. ' °9 These considerations are
double-edged, because they can restrict or broaden a court's jurisdictional
reach." 0 However, in all cases, these fairness and reasonableness consider-
Justice Brennan dissented. Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan criticized
the Court for giving insufficient weight to Oklahoma's interests and for failing to determine
whether the defendants would suffer any actual inconvenience. Id. at 299-300. He also
criticized the Court for accepting the proposition that a defendant could be haled into a forum
when it places products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that the products
will be purchased in the forum, while rejecting the proposition that a defendant could be haled
into court when a consumer brings a product "intended to be moved around" into the forum.
Id. at 306-07. Justice Brennan concluded that there was a strong connection between the
defendants and Oklahoma and that the defendants had received sufficient benefits from the
forum which allowed the constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 307.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, also dissented. Id. at 313 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that jurisdiction in this case was not premised on an
isolated incident, but was instead premised "on the deliberate and purposeful actions of the
defendants themselves in choosing to become part of a nationwide, indeed a global, network
for marketing and servicing automobiles." Id. at 313-14. Justice Marshall emphasized that
it was fair to require a commercial actor to answer for the consequences of its commercial
activities in those forums were the activities cause negative effects. Id. at 317. In a separate
dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun added that automobiles regularly travel across state lines
and that the defendants received benefits from Oklahoma, including its maintenance of its
roads. Id. at 318-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that International
Shoe allowed the exercise of jurisdiction in this and similar cases involving automobile
retailers and distributors. Id. at 319.
108. See id. at 291-92 (describing role of fairness and reasonableness in minimum
contacts test).
109. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
110. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (explaining Due Process Clause forbids unreasonable assertions of
personal jurisdiction and refusing to exercise jurisdiction despite finding of minimum contacts
between defendant and forum because of fairness concerns); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477
(describing role of fairness and reasonableness in minimum contacts analysis). In Burger
King, the Court explained: "These considerations sometimes serve to establish the reasonable-
ness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be
required. On the other hand, where a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities
at forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Id. at 477
(internal citations omitted) (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780
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ations ensure that a court's attempted exercise of jurisdiction satisfies "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'1" These fairness and
reasonableness considerations may become critical for the proper measure-
ment of World Wide Web advertising contacts.
112
IV. Purposeful Minimum Contacts Arising from World Wide
Web Advertisements
This Part discusses the standards for finding purposeful minimum
contacts in World Wide Web advertising cases. It begins by discussing the
initial hurdles to finding purposeful minimum contacts in World Wide Web
advertising cases.113 It continues with a discussion of the current standards
for analyzing World Wide Web advertising contacts. 114 Finally, Part IV
suggests that courts adopt a flexible two-step approach for analyzing World
Wide Web advertising contacts." 5
A. Initial Hurdles
Unique features of the World Wide Web and the Internet create initial,
yet surmountable, hurdles to finding purposeful minimum contacts in World
Wide Web advertising cases. The World Wide Web's system for transfer-
ring information complicates attempts to find purposeful availment.1 16 In
addition, the Internet's internal structure makes it difficult to determine
which forums the advertiser intends or should reasonably expect its adver-
tisement to reach. 7
(1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957)).
111. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940), quoted in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). But see Stephens, supra note 76, at 105-06 (calling
modem two-step minimum contacts test unworkable).
112. See infra Part V (discussing importance of fairness and reasonableness consider-
ations in World Wide Web advertising cases).
.113. See infra Part IV.A (discussing initial hurdles to finding purposeful minimum
contacts).
114. See infra Part IV.B (discussing and criticizing current World Wide Web jurisdic-
tional jurisprudence).
115. See infra Part IV.C (suggesting standard for analyzing World Wide Web advertising
contacts).
116. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (requiring purposeful availment
of forum by defendant); infra Part 1V.A.1 (discussing jurisdictional implications of World
Wide Web's request-and-response system).
117. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (requiring purpose-
ful direction of activities toward residents of forum); infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Internet's
and World Wide Web's geographic insensitivity).
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1. The World Wide Web's Request-and-Response System
The World Wide Web's request-and-response system for transferring
information creates superficial minimum contacts difficulties.118 World Wide
Web publishers place information on World Wide Web sites located in a
particular forum and connected to the Internet. 9 World Wide Web users
who want to access the advertisement send a request to the computer that
contains the publisher's World Wide Web site, and the site's computer
automatically responds to the user by sending the requested World Wide
Web page. 12' In this system, the advertisement only enters the forum upon
the request of the user. 121
The unilateral action of a third party cannot establish minimum contacts
under International Shoe. 22 In the request-and-response system, a World
Wide Web user normally must take several affirmative steps to gain access
to a World Wide Web advertisement." This raises the analytical problem
of whether the user avails himself of the forum where the World Wide Web
site is located or whether the advertiser avails himself of the forum where the
user is located. 24 However, the problem is more apparent than real for
purposeful availment purposes.
118. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1111-15 (describing potential jurisdictional impact of
World Wide Web's request-and-response system).
119. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing World
Wide Web publishing), af4'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). The World Wide Web's technical
operation is not always as clean as this statement indicates. For example, the common
practice of caching (storing) copies of popular World Wide Web pages on different computers
to ease Internet traffic often obscures the actual location of the World Wide Web page and
other Internet resources. See id. at 848-49 (describing problems in identifying origin of
Internet content because of caching).
120. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997) (noting World Wide Web pages
do not reach user unbidden). Some World Wide Web advertisements, particularly banner
advertisements, reach the user without conscious effort by the user. See Quittner, supra note
72, at 34 (noting World Wide Web site operators place banner advertisements on non-
advertising World Wide Web sites). In addition, sometimes users access advertisements by
mistake. But cf. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336 (noting that users rarely encounter sexually explicit
material by accident).
121. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting several affirmative steps required by forum resident to access foreign World Wide
Web advertisement), 4'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
122. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (interpreting International Shoe
minimum contacts test as forbidding exercise of personal jurisdiction unless defendant
purposefully avails itself of forum); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (adopting minimum contact test).
123. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299 (describing access of World Wide Web sites).
124. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1111-15 (describing purposeful availment issues raised
by request-and-response system).
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In stream of commerce cases, courts have rejected attempts by manufac-
turers to insulate themselves from findings of purposeful minimum contacts
through the creation of complex product distribution and marketing
systems."z The key factor weighing in favor of finding purposeful availment
in those stream of commerce cases has been the actual placement of the
product into the stream of commerce.' 26 Similarly, the World Wide Web's
unique distribution system should not insulate publishers from findings of
purposeful minimum contacts simply because a World Wide Web advertise-
ment, continuously available to forum residents, only enters the forum upon
the request of the advertiser. 27
An advertiser does everything necessary for its advertisement to reach
a forum when it places its advertisement on the World Wide Web.'2 This
interpretation eliminates the superficial obstacle to finding purposeful mini-
mum contacts posed by the World Wide Web's request-and-response
system.' 29 However, due process still requires an analysis of the advertiser's
125. See Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh, 618 F.2d 1186, 1190 (6th Cir. 1980) (exercising
personal jurisdiction over manufacturer who used independent distributor), discussed in
Stephens, supra note 76, at 111; Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni
Agusta, 553 F. Supp. 328, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (exercising personal jurisdiction over manu-
facturer "once or twice removed" from final sale), discussed in Stephens, supra note 76, at
111-12; Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720-22 (Minn. 1985) (exercising personal
jurisdiction over defendant who used independent distributors to distribute products in forum
and citing other cases where courts exercised personal jurisdiction over defendants who
established indirect contacts with forum through stream of commerce), cited in State v.
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5,
1997).
126. See Stephens, supra note 76, at 111-12 (describing irrelevance of complex distribu-
tion systems in minimum contacts analysis).
127. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(emphasizing continuous availability of World Wide Web advertisement in forum).
128. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(describing purposefulness of placing advertisements on World Wide Web). The CyberGold
court stated: "By simply setting up, and posting information at, a website in the form of an
advertisement or solicitation, one has done everything necessary to reach the global internet
audience." Id.
129. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *7
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that posting World Wide
Web advertisement does not constitute purposeful availment), 4f'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL
557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997). The Granite Gate court also quotes Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. .1996), which although
not a personal jurisdiction case, explains the legal significance of the World Wide Web's
request-and-response system. Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *9. In Chuckleberry, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York stated: "By inviting United
States users to download these images, Tattilo is causing and contributing to their distribution
within the United States." Chucklebeny, 939 F. Supp. at 1044. However, the Chuckleberry
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intent and reasonable expectations to determine whether the advertiser
actually established contacts with the forum that give rise to the foreseeabil-
ity of suit within the forum. 3
court refused to find that it could prohibit the defendant from operating a World Wide Web
site merely because the defendant's site was accessible within the forum. Chuckleberry, 939
F. Supp. at 1039. The Chucklebeny court explained that "[s]uch a holding would have a
devastating impact on those who use this global service." Id. at 1039-40; see Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to exercise
personal jurisdiction based on mere availability of World Wide Web advertisement in forum),
4'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
The Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), may also
ultimately affect the legal significance of the World Wide Web's request-and-response system
in the minimum contacts analysis. In Reno, the Court declared two key provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.
See id. at 2334 (finding provisions designed to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently
offensive" speech unconstitutional). Both the district court and the Supreme Court were
influenced by the fact that several affirmative steps are required to access information on the
Internet and its World Wide Web. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-45 (E.D. Pa.
1996), af4'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997). The
district court explained that "the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial." ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 845. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's use of the "dial-a-porn"
case, Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), to measure the
constitutionality of the CDA. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346. Like the district court, the Supreme
Court took note of the fact that "the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio or television." Id.
at 2343; cf. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299 (noting several affirmative steps required to access
World Wide Web page).
It remains to be seen which of three alternatives courts will ultimately adopt concerning
the jurisdictional significance of the request-and-response system: (1) that the method of
transmission is irrelevant; (2) that the method of transmission weighs against a finding of
purposeful availment; or (3) that the method of transmission prevents a finding of purposeful
availment based on World Wide Web advertising contacts.
130. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(explaining importance of foreseeability of suit in minimum contacts analysis). In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Court explained that
the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood
that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defen-
dant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reason-
ably anticipate being haled into court there.
Id. While placement of products into the stream of commerce constitutes a purposeful act,
there still remains a question concerning which forums the defendant attempted to reach. See
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) (requiring additional conduct by defendant indicating intent to serve forum); id. at
116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting additional conduct approach, but still requiring
defendant's awareness that products are marketed in forum). Similarly, although placement
of an advertisement on the World Wide Web constitutes a purposeful act, there still remains
a question concerning which forums the advertiser attempted to reach.
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2. The Internet's Geographic Insensitivity
The Internet - including its World Wide Web - has an expansive
geographic reach that allows information to pass without reference to limits
imposed by territorial borders. 1 ' This feature gives advertisers access to
consumers located throughout the United States and around the world.'
32
However, this geographic insensitivity also complicates efforts to direct or
to limit the geographical reach of an advertisement.'33 A World Wide Web
user in New York usually accesses World Wide Web sites with little or no
knowledge of whether the information accessed is stored on a computer in
New York, California, or Great Britain.' 34 Similarly, many World Wide
Web advertisers possess little reliable information concerning the physical
location of users who access their advertisements.3 3 Even where the adver-
tiser possesses such information concerning the user's location, technological
131. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing Internet's
global reach), t'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); Johnson & Post, supra note 27, at 1370-71
(describing ease of trans-border Internet communication).
132. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831 (describing world wide reach of World Wide
Web).
133. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462-63 (D.
Mass. 1997) (discussing Internet's lack of territorial boundaries and difficulty in controlling
dissemination of information); see also American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160,
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing infeasibility of restricting access to Internet communica-
tions). In American Libraries Ass'n, several organizations challenged a New York law that
criminalized distribution of pornographic materials to minors via the Internet and other
computer communications networks. Id. at 161-64. Likening the Internet to a highway or
railroad, the district court found that New York's statute violated the Commerce Clause. Id.
at 161, 183-84. The court observed:
An internet user who posts a Web page cannot prevent New Yorkers or Oklaho-
mans or Iowans from accessing that page and will not even know from what state
visitors to that site hail. Nor can a participant in a chat room prevent other
participants from a particular state from joining the conversation. Someone who
uses a mail exploder is similarly unaware of the precise contours of the mailing list
that will ultimately determine the recipients of his or her message, because users
can add or remove their names from a mailing list automatically. Thus, a person
could choose a list believed not to include any New Yorkers, but an after-added
New Yorker would still receive the message.
Id. at 171.
134. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1111 (describing Internet user's disinterest in or
ignorance of geographic locations of Internet resources).
135. Id. (describing World Wide Web site owner's ignorance of identity of its site's
users). But see State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at
*8-9 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (noting activities of World Wide Web advertiser who
collected information concerning user's identity and geographic location), af4'd, No. C6-97-
89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997).
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limitations render attempts to control access to World Wide Web advertise-
ments ineffectual or self-defeating."'
The Internet's, and consequently the World Wide Web's, geographical
insensitivity places the issue of purposefulness at the heart of World Wide
Web advertising cases. 137  Purposeful minimum contacts arise when the
defendant purposefully avails himself of the benefits and protections of the
forum's laws131 or when the defendant engages in conduct directed toward
the forum that has foreseeable negative effects in the forum. 9 However, the
geographic indifference surrounding most transmissions of information on
the World Wide Web leaves courts without a reliable guide of the defendant
advertiser's intent and reasonable expectations.Y Did the advertiser intend
to avail itself of a limited number of forums,' 4' of every forum, 42 or of
136. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 844-49 (describing difficulties restricting access to sex-
ually explicit material on Internet); American Library Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (explaining "no aspect of the Internet can feasibly be closed off to users from another
state"). The American Libraries Ass'n court explained that
an Internet user cannot foreclose access to her work from certain states or send
differing versions of her communication to different jurisdictions. In this sense,
the Internet user is in a worse position than the truck driver or train engineer
who can steer around Illinois or Arizona, or change the mudguard or train
configuration at the state line; the Internet user has no ability to bypass any par-
ticular state.
Id. at 183.
137. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 (1985) (requiring purpose-
ful direction of activities toward forum before exercising personal jurisdiction). In Burger
King, the Court called the purposeful minimum contacts requirement "the constitutional
touchstone" of the minimum contacts analysis. Id. at 474.
138. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (explaining purposeful availment
requirement).
139. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-91 (1984) (introducing effects test); see also
supra Part IlI.A (describing purposeful minimum contacts analysis).
140. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1109-11 (discussing virtual contacts). Professor Burk
argues that application of the minimum contacts test to Internet contacts would lead to
anomalous results because "the network's structural indifference to geographic position is
incongruous with the fundamental assumptions underlying the International Shoe test." Id.
at 1109.
141. See Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1988)
(finding advertisement in nationally circulated trade magazine insufficient to establish purpose-
ful availment of forum). The Lake Havasu court found that the defendant (whose business was
centered in Arizona and California) had directed its advertisement toward those forums and
not toward Minnesota. Id.
142. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(noting that "Instruction has directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its toll-free
number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all states").
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"Cyberspace"''  itself?'" Does the placement of an advertisement on the
World Wide Web alert the defendant to the reasonable foreseeability of suit
within every forum the advertisement reaches? 45 Although it is unlikely that
courts would ever recognize "Cyberspace" as a unique jurisdiction free from
control by territorial-based courts,'" the courts disagree about whether the
143. See STEVEN E. MILLER, CIVILIZING CYBERSPACE: POLICY, POWER, AND THE
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 1 (1996). Cyberspace is a term of art. According to Miller,
Cyberspace "represents the transformation of communications technology from a connection
between locations into a location of its own." Id. The term Cyberspace was coined by science
fiction writer William Gibson well before the Internet gained public prominence. WILLIAM
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984). Gibson defined Cyberspace as "[a] consensual hallucina-
tion experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being
taught mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks
of every computer in the human system." Id. Psychologist Sherry Turkle describes
Cyberspace as a psychological phenomenon:
The use of the term "cyberspace" to describe virtual worlds grew out of science
fiction, but for many of us, cyberspace is now part of the routines of everyday
life. When we read our electronic mail or send postings to an electronic bulletin
board or make an airline reservation over a computer network, we are in
cyberspace. In cyberspace, we can talk, exchange ideas, and assume personae of
our own creation. We have the opportunity to build new kinds of communities,
virtual communities, in which we participate with people from all over the world,
people with whom we converse daily, people with whom we may have fairly
intimate relationships but whom we may never physically meet.
SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 9-10 (1996)
(footnote omitted). Even the Supreme Court has described Cyberspace as a unique place:
"Taken together, these tools constitute a unique medium - known to its users as 'eyber-
space' - located in no particular geographic location but available to anyone, anywhere in the
world, with access to the Internet." Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334-35 (1997).
144. See Swedlow, supra note 19, at 378-81 (describing nonterritorial "paradigm" for
evaluating personal jurisdiction claims against World Wide Web advertisers).
145. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (noting defendant
must have "fair warning" of possibility of suit within forum); World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (noting defendant's conduct must give rise to reasonable
anticipation of suit within forum).
146. See supra note 27 (describing efforts to regulate Internet). Some scholars support
the establishment of Cyberspace as its own jurisdiction. See Johnson & Post, supra note 27,
at 1367-68 (calling for new jurisdiction: Cyberspace). Johnson and Post argue:
Global computer-based communications cut across territorial borders, creating a
new realm of human activity and undermining the feasibility - and legitimacy -
of laws based on geographic boundaries. While these electronic communications
play havoc with geographic boundaries, a new boundary, made up of screens and
passwords that separate the virtual world from the "real world" of atoms,
emerges.
Id. at 1367; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1743-44
(1995) (discussing options of regulating Cyberspace by analogy to past or starting anew). In
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simple act of placing an advertisement on the World Wide Web constitutes
purposeful availment of every forum the World Wide Web reaches. 47
B. Current Approaches to Weighing World Wide Web
Advertising Contacts
Courts began active consideration of the jurisdictional effect of World
Wide Web advertising in early 1996.148 Several courts have since decided
that World Wide Web advertising creates a substantial connection with the
forum that allows or at least weighs in favor of the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction.' 49 For these courts, the mere placement of an adver-
tisement on the World Wide Web creates a substantial connection with the
forum."5 However, another court has decided that World Wide Web adver-
tising contacts alone do not create a substantial connection with a forum and
do not support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction.' This court
addition, some argue that legal events can occur in Cyberspace. See Kwatra v. MCI, Inc.,
No. 96 Civ. 2491 (DC), 1996 WL 694444, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1996) (noting plaintiffs'
argument that case's events occurred in "New York, New Jersey, Virginia, and Cyberspace").
Whether or not the courts ever recognize "Cyberspace" as a jurisdiction, every Internet
user remains subject to at least one jurisdiction. See Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdic-
don and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB.
L.J. SCi. & TECH. 339, 346-47 (1996) (describing continued effectiveness of real world
jurisdictional paradigms).
147. Compare Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996) (noting placement of advertisement on World Wide Web is purposefully directed toward
all states), with Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding mere placement of advertisement on World Wide Web does not constitute purposeful
availment of forum), t'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
148. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 162-63 (describing defendant's World Wide Web
advertising activities).
149. See id. at 165 (exercising personal jurisdiction over World Wide Web advertiser);
Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding
sufficient minimum contacts between forum and defendant for exercise of specific jurisdic-
tion); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *8-10 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (finding minimum contacts between defendant and forum), aft'd, No.
C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found.,
958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (weighing defendant's World Wide Web advertisement in
favor of exercise of jurisdiction).
150. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (noting that transmission of advertising
information to all Internet users favors exercise of personal jurisdiction); Inset, 937 F. Supp.
at 165 (noting that Internet and toll-free telephone numbers are designed to reach residents of
every state); Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (explaining that placement of solicitation
on Internet establishes minimum contacts with forum).
151. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (finding that placement of advertisement on
World Wide Web does not demonstrate purposeful availment of forum); see also Weber v.
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explained that proof of additional conduct, beyond mere placement of an
advertisement on the World Wide Web, is necessary to establish a substantial
connection.'52
The prevailing approaches for analyzing World Wide Web advertising
contacts - "mere placement" and "additional conduct" - derive from the
approaches developed by Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan in the stream
of commerce case Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court. 5 1 Unfortu-
Jolly Hotels, No. CIV. A. 96-2582, 1997 WL 574950, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1997) (finding
placement of advertisement on Internet does not constitute purposeful availment); Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (exercising personal
jurisdiction over defendant, but citing Bensusan and noting passive World Wide Web adver-
tisement alone does not establish purposeful availment of forum); Graphic Controls Corp. v.
Utah Medical Prods., Inc., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232, at *3-4 (W.D.N.Y. May
21, 1997) (finding toll-free telephone number and information available on Internet do not
demonstrate purposeful availment of any particular forum, including New York); Hearst Corp.
v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997) (mag. j. report and recommendation) (recommending court not exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresident World Wide Web advertiser).
152. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (explaining need for additional evidence suggest-
ing defendant purposefully availed itself of forum).
153. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (finding additional conduct required to create substantial connection
between contact and claim in stream of commerce case); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(finding defendant's mere awareness that product is marketed in forum establishes foreseeabil-
ity of suit). In Asahi, the Court considered whether California could exercise personal
jurisdiction over an alien defendant based on the defendant's mere awareness that the compo-
nent parts it placed into the stream of commerce would reach the forum State. Id. at 105.
Asahi involved a third-party indemnification action brought by a Taiwanese manufacturer
against a Japanese supplier. Id. at 106. The indemnification action arose out of a products
liability suit brought in California by an injured California resident against the Taiwanese
manufacturer. Id. at 105-06. The plaintiff and original defendant settled the products liability
suit, thus leaving only the indemnification action. Id. at 106. The third-party defendant's
only contacts with the forum consisted of the sale of tire valve assemblies to the Taiwanese
manufacturer who incorporated the valve assemblies into tires in Taiwan and then distributed
the tires worldwide. Id. Some of the tires reached California. Id.
The Court found, eight-to-zero, that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Japanese
defendant was unreasonable and unfair under the Due Process Clause because of "the interna-
tional context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff
and the forum state." Id. at 116. However, the Court split four-to-four over whether the
defendant purposefully availed itself of California. Id. at 104, 112-13 (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion), 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argued that the defendant's mere
awareness that products placed into the stream of commerce might or would enter the forum
did not satisfy due process. Id. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). She argued that
purposeful availment required additional conduct indicating the defendant's intent-to serve the
forum market. Id. Justice Brennan argued that the defendant's mere awareness that a product
is marketed in the forum establishes the foreseeability of suit in the forum. Id. at 117
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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nately, both the mere placement and the additional conduct approaches are
too rigid to provide a consistently constitutional minimum contacts analysis
in World Wide Web advertising cases. 54 Instead, courts should adopt a
more flexible minimum contacts analysis that recognizes the great variation
in the quality and nature of World Wide Web advertisements themselves. 5
1. The Mere Placement Approach to World Wide Web
Advertising Contacts
Three courts have used the mere placement approach to World Wide
Web advertising contacts to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants.156 In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,157 the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut exercised personal jurisdiction
over a Massachusetts computer company whose Internet (World Wide
Web)5 8 advertisement contained elements that allegedly infringed the plain-
tiff's trademarks. 9 In Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc. ,'6 the United States
Justice Stevens refused to join either opinion on the issue of purposeful availment. Id. at
121 (Stevens, J., concurring). He argued that a determination of purposeful availment and
minimum contacts was unnecessary once the Court determined that the exercise of jurisdiction
was unfair and unreasonable. Id. at 122.
154. See infra Part IV.B.I.c (describing difficulties in applying mere placement ap-
proach); infra Part IV.B.2.c (describing difficulties in applying additional conduct approach).
155. See infra Part IV.C (suggesting flexible two-step approach for analyzing World
Wide Web advertising contacts).
156. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(exercising jurisdiction over nonresident World Wide Web advertiser); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction over
nonresident based on existence of defendant's World Wide Web advertisement and toll-free
telephone number): State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431,
at *6-11 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (exercising personal jurisdiction based on World
Wide Web advertising contacts), aft'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 5, 1997).
157. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
158. The Inset court refers to Instruction Set's World Wide Web advertisement as an
Internet advertisement throughout the opinion. This Note, for the sake of uniformity,
describes the defendant's advertisement as a World Wide Web advertisement. See Burk,
supra note 23, at 1111 n.70 (noting that Inset involved World Wide Web site).
159. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1995)(exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident World Wide Web advertiser); see infra
Part IV.B.l.a.i (discussing Inset). The Inset court found both the Connecticut long-arm statute
and the Due Process Clause satisfied. Id. at 162. First, the court found that Instruction Set's
activities satisfied the Connecticut long-arm statute which allowed the exercise of jurisdiction
over any claim arising "out of any business solicited-in this state by mail or otherwise if the
corporation has repeatedly so solicited business" Id. at 163-64 & n.2. The court then found
that the defendant's advertising activities constituted purposeful availment of Connecticut and
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District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri also exercised jurisdiction
over a nonresident advertiser whose World Wide Web advertisement con-
tained allegedly infringing marks. 6' Finally, in State v. Granite Gate
Resorts, Inc.,162 a Minnesota state district court exercised personal jurisdic-
tion over a World Wide Web advertiser on consumer protection-related
claims. 63 In each case, the courts found the mere use of the World Wide
Web for advertising contributed to, or fully established, minimum contacts
and justified the court's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction."6
This Section begins with a description of the facts of and the minimum
contacts analysis applied in Inset, CyberGold, and Granite Gate. 65 It con-
tinues with an argument that the mere placement approach derives from the
stream of commerce analysis used by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion in Asahi.'66 This Section concludes that mere placement approach
that the exercise of jurisdiction satisfied traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Id. at 164-65.
160. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
161. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident World Wide Web advertiser); see infra Part
IV.B.l.a.ii (discussing CyberGold). The CyberGold court found both state and federal
personal jurisdiction requirements satisfied. Id. The court refused to determine whether
placement of an advertisement on the World Wide Web satisfied "transaction of any business"
provision in Missouri's long-arm statute. Id. at 1331. Instead, the Court found that the
advertisement satisfied the statute's "commission of tortious act" provision because of the
allegations of trademark infringement. Id. The court then determined that the exercise of
jurisdiction satisfied due process. Id. at 1332-34; infra note 196 (discussing CyberGold
court's minimum contacts analysis).
162. No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
163. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *11
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (exercising personal jurisdiction over World Wide Web
advertiser), ff'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997); see infra
Part IV.B.1.a.iii (discussing Granite Gate). The district court combined its long-arm
jurisdiction analysis and its minimum contacts analysis because Minnesota's long-arm statute
extends to the limits of the Due Process Clause. Id. at *6 (discussing Minnesota's due process
analysis) (citing Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1978)
(explaining Minnesota's transacting business provision in long-arm statute extends jurisdiction
to limits of due process)).
164. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (finding defendant "consciously decided to
transmit advertising information to all internet users," including Missouri Internet users);
Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163 (explaining defendant directed its advertising to all Internet users,
including Connecticut Internet users); Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (finding World
Wide Web advertisement established in anticipation of access "by any and all Internet users,
including Minnesota residents).
165. See infra Part IV.B.1.a (discussing Inset, CyberGold, and Granite Gate).
166. See infra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing Justice Brennan's mere awareness test).
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is too inflexible for consistently constitutional application of the minimum
contacts test to World Wide Web advertising contacts.1 67
a. The Mere Placement Approach in Practice
i. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.
Inset involved a trademark dispute between two computer companies.'
68
The Connecticut plaintiff, Inset, brought suit in Connecticut against the
Massachusetts defendant, Instruction Set, on a variety of claims including
trademark infringement. 169 Instruction Set maintained a World Wide Web
site with the domain name "inset.com" '1 70 and the toll-free telephone number
"1-800-US-INSET.'' I 7 Inset owned the federally registered trademark
"Inset.v' 72  The court found minimum contacts despite the defendant's
assertions that it did not regularly conduct business in Connecticut and that
it did not have employees in the state." The court based its finding of
minimum contacts primarily on the defendant's World Wide Web advertising
activities. "
167. See infra Part IV.B.I.c (explaining deficiencies in mere placement test).
168. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Conn. 1996)
(describing plaintiff's and defendant's businesses).
169. See id. at 161-62 (describing plaintiff's claims). The plaintiffs additional claims
included state trademark infringement, unfair competition, dilution, injury to business reputa-
tion, and unfair trade practices. Id. at 162.
170. See KROL & FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 33-38 (discussing domain names).
Domain names are simply the addresses of computers that host World Wide Web sites, or
perform other Internet functions. Id. Examples of domain names include "whitehouse.gov,"
"wlu.edu," and "ibm.com." Internet domain names and addresses have caused countless dis-
putes because of relatively lax registration standards that allow individuals to register Internet
addresses containing either registered trademarks or other names highly suggestive of easily
recognized corporations, events, or products. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F.
Supp. 616, 619 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (describing Toeppen's registration and ransoming of domain
names such as "camdenyards.com," "frenchopen.com," and "aircanada.com"). Many cases
involving the Internet and the World Wide Web, including World Wide Web advertising cases,
center on disputes involving domain names. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc.,
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (involving dispute over, inter alia, rights to addresses
"zippo.com," "zippo.net," and "zipponews.com"); Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. at 619 (involving
dispute over rights to "panavision.com" and "panaflex.com"); Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163 (in-
volving, inter alia, rights to address "inset.com"); MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202,
203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concerning operation of "mtv.com" by former MTV employee).
171. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 164 (noting defendant's arguments urging dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds).
174. See id. at 164-65 (finding minimum contacts based on defendant's World Wide Web
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The Inset court began its minimum contacts analysis by noting that
Instruction Set's advertising activities had several unique characteristics that
justified the court's finding of minimum contacts.17 First, the court noted
that World Wide Web advertising and toll-free telephone numbers "are
designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state. ""1
Next, the court observed that World Wide Web advertisements could reach
as many as ten thousand Connecticut Internet users."7 Finally, the court
determined that World Wide Web advertisements are more pervasive and
accessible than television and radio advertisements 7  According to the Inset
court, these factors gave Instruction Set sufficient warning of potential
lawsuits arising from its use of the World Wide Web for advertising. 179 In
addition, the court briefly noted the absence of any mitigating factors which
would have rendered the exercise of jurisdiction unfair and unreasonable."S
ii. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.
CyberGold involved a trademark dispute between two companies that
independently were developing Internet-delivered advertising services.81'
advertising activities). The court also counted the defendant's toll-free telephone number as
a contact. Id. at 163.




178. See id. (describing differences between World Wide Web advertisements and
advertisements in other media, including television and radio). Earlier, during its discussion
of the reach of Connecticut's long-arn statute, the court also explained that World Wide Web
advertisements are more enduring than print advertisements "which are often quickly disposed
of and reach a limited number of potential consumers." Id. at 164.
179. See id. at 165 (finding Instruction Set "could reasonably anticipate the possibility of
being hailed into court" in Connecticut); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 296-98 (1980) (requiring sufficient warning that defendant's actions may give
rise to suits in forum).
180. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (discussing considerations of fairness and reasonable-
ness). The court determined that the defendant bore no particularly onerous burden in
defending suit in Connecticut. Id. In particular, the court noted the "minimal" distance
between the Massachusetts defendant and Connecticut. Id. The court also found that Connect-
icut possessed an interest in adjudicating the dispute which involved issues of Connecticut law
and found that Connecticut could dispose of the matter efficiently. Id. After making these
observations, the court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction satisfied traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. Id.
181. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(describing CyberGold's advertising plans). The court described the plaintiff's and defen-
dant's advertising activities in a subsequent opinion which did not address jurisdictional issues.
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CyberGold established a World Wide Web site that encouraged users to
submit their name and other personal information to CyberGold."
CyberGold was planning to use this information to send future targeted
advertisements to registered recipients; 83 however, at the time of the suit,
only CyberGold's basic World Wide Web site was active.' Maritz sued
and claimed that CyberGold's name and advertising infringed Maritz's
Goldmail trademark.'5
The CyberGold court began its jurisdictional analysis by listing all of
CyberGold's contacts with the forum: "CyberGold maintains an internet site
on the World Wide Web . . . [that is] continually accessible to every
internet-connected computer in Missouri and the world."'86  The court
described no contacts between the defendant and the forum other than those
created by the defendant's World Wide Web advertisement. Thus, the court
found that CyberGold's World Wide Web advertisement alone established
minimum contacts with Missouri."s
The court explained its minimum contacts finding by noting the unique
features of the Internet compared to traditional (and more familiar) forms of
communication.' The court called the Internet "an entirely new means of
information exchange."'8 9 It then described the Internet as "a tremendously
more efficient, quicker, and vast means of reaching a global audience"
compared to both the postal system and toll-free telephone numbers."9 The
court placed special emphasis on its finding that when the CyberGold World
Wide Web site responded to the user's request for information, the site
"indiscriminately" responded. 9' The court used these comparisons to find
See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1338, 1338-40 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (denying
plaintiff's request for temporary injunction); see also Laura Castaneda, Marketers Are Suing
Over Gold, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 1996, at C1 (describing CyberGold and Maritz advertising
services); Debra Aho Williamson, Golden Opportunities Tangle in Legal Battle, ADVERTISING
AGE, July 15, 1996, at 14 (same).
182. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1330 (discussing CyberGold's data collection
methods).
183. See id. (discussing CyberGold's advertising strategy).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1329, 1336.
186. Id. at 1330.
187. See id. at 1334 (finding minimum contacts arising from World Wide Web advertis-
ing contacts).
188. See id. at 1332 (describing unique features of Internet and World Wide Web).
189. Id.
190. See id. (comparing Internet and more traditional forms of communication).
191. See id. at 1333 (analogizing between World Wide Web's automatic request-and-
response system and hypothetical advertiser's ability to decide whether or not to respond to
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that "the nature and quality of contacts provided by the maintenance of a
website on the internet are clearly of a different nature and quality than other
means of contact with a forum. .... "192
The CyberGold court's finding that World Wide Web advertising
contacts create unique contacts left it with a critical decision to make. Freed
from traditional precedents, it needed to decide "[w]hether sufficient mini-
mum contacts... can be established solely through the use of computers
and electronic communications." 193 The court cited three cases, including
Inset, to support its conclusion that CyberGold purposefully availed itself of
Missouri through its use of the World Wide Web for advertising.194 The
determinative factor for the court was its observation that "[b]y simply
setting up, and posting information at, a website in the form of an advertise-
ment or a solicitation, one has done everything necessary to reach the global
internet audience."' ' According to the court, this simple action satisfied the
purposeful availment requirement. 96 The court also determined that its
requests made by regular mail).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1333-34.
194. Id. at 1334 (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir.
1996) (exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant based in part on defendant's
use of plaintiff's computer network); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (asserting personal jurisdiction based on defendant's use of Internet
and toll-free telephone numbers for advertising); California Software Inc. v. Reliability
Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (exercising personal jurisdiction
based on effects of defendant's tortious communications transmitted via computer network)).
195. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
196. See id. at 1334 (concluding defendant's World Wide Web activities constituted pur-
poseful availment of forum). One commentator has argued that the CyberGold court applied
the Calder v. Jones effects test rather than a Hanson v. Denckla purposeful availment analysis.
See Burk, supra note 90, 55-57 (arguing CyberGold court improperly applied Calder
standard); see also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (describing Hanson purposeful
availment standard); supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (describing Calder effects test).
However, a close reading of the CyberGold court's minimum contacts analysis suggests that
the court did not actually apply Calder. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1332-34 (applying
minimum contacts test to defendant's World Wide Web adverstising contacts). In its state law
analysis, the court followed earlier cases and invoked the "commission of a tortious act"
provision of the Missouri long-arm statute which allows the exercise of jurisdiction over
defendants who commit tortious acts outside the forum that cause negative effects within the
forum. Id. at 1331; see May Dept. Stores Co. v. Wilansky, 900 F. Supp. 1154, 1160-61
(E.D. Mo. 1995) (finding state tortious act provision satisfied agaitst defendant Bon-Ton);
Peabody Holding Co. v. Costain Group PLC, 808 F. Supp. 1425, 1433-34 (E.D. Mo. 1992)
(finding state tortious act provision satisfied where defendant's extraterritorial acts caused
effects in forum). However, in its minimum contacts analysis the CyberGold court repeatedly
emphasized that it found the exercise of jurisdiction satisfied due process because the plaintiff
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exercise of personal jurisdiction was fair and reasonable. 1"
iii. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.
The cause of action in Granite Gate differed from the causes of action
Inset and CyberGold, but the court's basis for finding minimum contacts
remained the same.1 98 Inset and CyberGold involved trademark-related
had "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business" within the forum. Id. at
1333-34. Indeed, the CyberGold court undertook its extensive minimum contacts analysis
because it noted that both the May and Peabody courts had refused to exercise jurisdiction
solely on the basis of the defendants' tortious actions which caused effects in the forum. Id.
at 1331-32; see May Dept. Stores, 900 F. Supp. at 1161 (refusing on due process grounds to
exercise jurisdiction over defendant Bon-Ton whose only contact with forum was impact of
extraterritorial tortious act); Peabody, 808 F. Supp. at 1437-38 (refusing to exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendant Altus based on tortious effects of extraterritorial conduct).
Professor Burk argues that the CyberGold court used Cai]fornia Software Inc. v. Reliabil-
ity Research, Inc., which in turn relied upon Calder, to extend "the Calder rule to find
jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state, because the effect of the alleged tort was felt there."
Burk, supra note 90, 55; see California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F.
Supp. 1356, 1361-64 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (applying Calder). Although the California Software
court relied on Calder for its own jurisdictional holding, the CyberGold court did not cite
California Software on this point. Instead, the CyberGold court used California Software to
support the proposition that Internet communications "are of a different nature" that conse-
quently increases the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.
CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1334; see California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1363 (finding
computer communications broaden permissible scope of personal jurisdiction). The Cyber-
Gold court cited two other cases in the same section (neither of which invoked Calder) to
support the same point. Id. (citing Inset and CompuServe to support argument that quality and
nature of electronic communications expand permissible scope of personal jurisdiction); see
also CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-67 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding defendant
purposefully availed himself of privilege of doing business in Ohio); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding defendant purposefully
availed itself of privilege of doing business within Connecticut).
197. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1334 (finding exercise of personal jurisdiction fair
and reasonable). The court noted that Missouri held an interest in adjudicating the dispute.
Id. The court also noted that the plaintiff had a strong interest in adjudicating the dispute in
Missouri. Id. Finally, the court found that CyberGold failed to demonstrate a burden in
having to defend an action in the forum. Id. The court did not discuss "the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies" nor did it mention
"the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations omitted).
198. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *1
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (describing claims against defendant), af4'd, No. C6-97-89,
1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997); id. at *10 (basing minimum contacts
finding on mere accessibility of World Wide Web advertisement in forum); infra notes 199-
201 and accompanying text (describing claims and minimum contacts analysis in CyberGold,
Inset, and Granite Gate).
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claims.1 9 Granite Gate involved claims of consumer fraud, false advertis-
ing, and deceptive trade practices.' In all three cases, the courts found that
the mere placement of an advertisement on the World Wide Web demon-
strated the defendant's purposeful availment of the forum.
201
In Granite Gate, the defendants maintained a World Wide Web site that
advertised their sports gambling service.m Minnesota's attorney general
argued that the advertisements were illegal in Minnesota and that by explic-
itly and implicitly touting the advertisement's legality,m the defendants
violated Minnesota law and brought themselves within reach of Minnesota's
long-arm jurisdiction.' The court agreed with the attorney general's juris-
dictional theory.'
The Granite Gate court undertook an extensive analysis of the defen-
dants' contacts with Minnesota.26 In particular, the court noted that the
defendants placed an advertisement on the World Wide Web, knowing that
the advertisement "had to reach national markets that included Minne-
199. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1329, 1334-36 (discussing plaintiff's Lanham Act
trademark infringement claim); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162
(D. Conn. 1996) (describing plaintiff's trademark infringement and other related claims).
200. See Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *1 (discussing state's claims against
defendant World Wide Web advertiser).
201. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(finding placement of advertisement on global World Wide Web established purposeful avail-
ment of forum); Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163 (same); Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *10
(same).
202. See Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *1-5 (describing defendants' World Wide
Web advertising activities). The defendants were Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., a Nevada
corporation doing business as On Ramp Internet Computer Services, and Kerry Rogers, the
president of On Ramp. Id. at *2.
203. See id. at *5 (explaining federal law prohibits "betting or wagering through wire
communication facilities").
204. See id. at *5, *10-11 (describing state's arguments); see also Burk, supra note 23,
at 1116 (describing position of Minnesota attorney general's office regarding exposure to
liability for World Wide Web commercial activities).
205. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *6-
11 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (applying minimum contacts analysis to defendants' World
Wide Web advertising contacts), a4t'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 5, 1997).
206. See id. at *6-10 (describing defendants' contacts with forum). The court employed
a five-step test to determine whether the defendants' contacts with the forum allowed the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at *6. The five steps included: (1) the quantity of the
defendants' contacts with the forum, (2) the nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the
connection between the cause of action and the contacts, (4) the state's interest in providing
a forum, and (5) the convenience of the parties. Id. The court found that the defendants'
contacts easily satisfied each of these steps. Id. at *7-11.
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sota."207 The court also noted that the defendants maintained a mailing list
that included information about the users who accessed the defendants' site
(including names and addresses of users).2°s The court determined that many
of those users were Minnesota residents.' Finally, the court observed that
the defendants tracked their site's usage and kept logs that indicated Minne-
sota based computers were used to access the site. 210
Although the Granite Gate court thus identified many factors that
contributed to its finding of purposeful availment,1 one factor dominated the
court's minimum contacts analysis.212 The court found that the defendants'
World Wide Web advertisement "logically appear[ed] to be maintained for
the purpose and in anticipation of being accessed and used by any and all
Internet users, including Minnesota residents." 213 The court explained that
"[w]hen one sets up and posts advertising information, one does everything
necessary to reach the global Internet audience." 214 According to the court,
the World Wide Web's reach and efficiency made the mere availability of a
World Wide Web advertisement in the forum a sufficient ground for the
exercise of jurisdiction.215 Finally, like the courts in Inset and CyberGold,
the Granite Gate court found that considerations of fairness and reasonable-
ness did not provide the defendants a safe haven.216
207. Id. at *7.
208. See id. at *8 (describing defendants' maintenance of mailing list).
209. See id. at *5 (explaining defendants' refusal to turn over mailing list allowed court
to assume existence of Minnesota residents on list for purposes of court's ruling on defendants'
motion to dismiss).
210. See id. at *9 (describing defendants' usage tracking and logs).
211. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997) (describing contacts found by district court), aft'g, No. C6-95-
7227, 1996 WL767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996).
212. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *7
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (noting one defendant's awareness that Internet advertisement
had to reach Minnesota), 4'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5,
1997).
213. Id. at *10.
214. Id.; see Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(explaining that "[bly simply setting up, and posting information at, a website in the form of
an advertisement or solicitation, one has done everything necessary to reach the global internet
audience"); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(finding that "Instruction had directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its toll-free
number toward not only the State of Connecticut, but to all states").
215. See Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (describing basis for exercising juris-
diction). The court explained that solicitation via the Internet "certainly arises to the type of
promotional activity or active solicitation to provide the minimum contacts necessary for
exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresidents." Id.
216. See id. at *11 (discussing considerations of fairness and reasonableness). The court
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A Minnesota appeals court recently affirmed the district court's decision
in Granite Gate.217 The court of appeals noted that the district court found
several contacts between the defendants and the forum that supported the
exercise of jurisdiction.21 However, the court of appeals agreed with the
district court that the key contact supporting the exercise of jurisdiction was
the defendants' action in setting up a commercial World Wide Web site
accessible in the forum.219 The court of appeals explained that the defen-
dants' Internet advertising, although not specifically directed at Minnesota,
"demonstrated a clear intent to solicit business from markets that include
Minnesota" and had resulted in multiple contacts with Minnesota and at least
one successful solicitation.' Finally, the court of appeals also found that
considerations of fairness and reasonableness did not limit its ability to
exercise personal jurisdiction."
noted Minnesota's strong interest in enforcing its consumer protection laws. Id. The court
also found no undue burden on the defendant in defending suits in the forum. Id. The court
explained that because the defendant reserved the right to sue its customers in the customers'
home states or Belize, an undue burden argument could not be accepted. Id.
217. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670, at *5 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997), af4'g, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767432 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11,
1996). The court of appeals found that "Internet advertisements are similar to broadcast and
direct mail solicitations." Id. at *5. The court used Minnesota and foreign case law to
support its argument that these similarities supported the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. How-
ever, many courts have found that nationwide advertising is not sufficient to subject a
defendant to personal jurisdiction. See Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 235-37 (discussing juris-
dictional effect of nationwide advertising and observing that courts ordinarily look for addi-
tional contacts to support exercise ofjurisdiction); see also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,
2343 (1997) (explaining World Wide Web sites are not as "invasive" as radio or television).
218. See id. at *3 (describing contacts between defendant and forum).
219. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *10
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (finding minimum contacts based on availability of advertise-
ment in forum), aft'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997); State
v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept.
5, 1997) (same). The court of appeals also mentioned contacts such as telephone calls placed
by Minnesota residents after accessing the defendant's advertisement. Id. at *3. However,
the court's purposeful availment analysis focuses on the defendants' World Wide Web adver-
tising activities, indicating that the defendants' non-World Wide Web advertising contacts do
not materially affect the court's overall analysis.
220. Granite Gate, 1997 WL 557670, at *7. The court of appeals apparently counted the
subscription by the state's investigator as a contact (and as the successful solicitation) between
the defendant and the forum. Id. at "2, *7. But see Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328, 1333 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (refusing to count 180 "contacts" created by plaintiff
when it accessed defendant's World Wide Web site because "[i]f such contacts were to be
considered, a plaintiff could always try to create personal jurisdiction").
221. See Granite Gate, 1997 WL 557670, at *6-7 (noting state's strong interest and lack
of great inconvenience to defendants).
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b. Evolution from Mere Awareness in Stream of Commerce Cases
In his concurring opinion in Asahi, Justice Brennan argued that a court
may exercise personal jurisdiction when products the defendant places into
the stream of commerce cause injury in a forum.'m Justice Brennan's
approach does not require defendants to possess or maintain any other
contacts with the forum.m Justice Brennan's approach does not require the
defendant to target or serve any forum in particular.24 Justice Brennan's
approach requires only the defendant's actual knowledge that the product is
marketed in the forum.' This relaxed minimum contacts standard is re-
stricted only by the fairness and reasonableness considerations identified in
World-Wide Volkswagen. 6
The similarities between Justice Brennan's mere awareness standard in
Asahi and the mere placement standard in Inset, CyberGold, and Granite
Gate are striking.' The World Wide Web mere placement approach allows
the exercise of jurisdiction when the advertisement the defendant places on
the World Wide Web reaches the forum and causes injury.' The mere
placement approach does not require the defendant to possess or maintain
any other contacts with the forum.2 9 The mere placement approach does not
222. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (explaining placement of goods into stream of commerce establishes foreseeability
of suits in forums where defendant knows products are marketed); see also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (explaining jurisdictional effect
of placing products into the stream of commerce). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court
explained: "The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it
asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of com-
merce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." Id.
223. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting need for additional
conduct directed toward forum).
224. See id. (noting that benefits accrue to defendant regardless of whether defendant
engaged in conduct specifically directed toward forum).
225. Id.
226. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (listing fairness and reasonableness
considerations); supra Part II1.B describing fairness and reasonableness considerations).
227. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1116-17 (describing similarities between Justice Bren-
nan's approach and Minnesota attorney general's position).
228. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(exercising personal jurisdiction over World Wide Web advertiser); Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn. 1996) (same); State v. Granite Gate
Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *10-11 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996)
(same), 4'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997).
229. See qCberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (finding Internet advertisement sufficient to
establish specific jurisdiction over defendant); supra Part IV.B.1.a.ii (describing CyberGold
case); Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (finding Internet advertisement and toll-free telephone
1312
JUPJSDICTION AROUND THE WHOLE WIDE WORLD?
require the defendant to target or serve any forum in particular." ° Finally,
the mere placement test is theoretically limited by the considerations of
fairness and reasonableness articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen.23
c. Difficulties in Applying the Mere Placement Approach
Justice Brennan's opinion carried only four votes in Asahi.232 However,
its application in a number of subsequent lower court decisions lends credi-
bility to the application of the mere placement approach in Inset, CyberGold,
and Granite Gate. 3 Indeed, placement of products into the stream of
commerce and placement of advertisements on the World Wide Web bear
superficial similarities that invite application of stream of commerce ap-
proaches to World Wide Web advertising contacts.' For example, placing
a product into the stream of commerce and advertising on the World Wide
Web both involve commercial activity that can reach multiple forumsY 5
However, critical differences between the World Wide Web and the stream
of commerce weigh strongly against wholesale application of a stream of
commerce analysis to World Wide Web advertising contactsY 6
number sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in Connecticut); supra Part IV.B.L.a.i
(discussing Inset); Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (exercising jurisdiction over World
Wide Web advertiser based entirely on World Wide Web advertisement); supra Part
IV.B.1.a.iii (describing Granite Gate).
230. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (finding purposeful availment through World
Wide Web site that transmits information globally); Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (finding
purposeful availment through Internet advertisement and toll-free telephone directed at all
states, including Connecticut); Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (finding advertisement
established purposeful availment).
231. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1334 (applying considerations of fairness and
reasonableness); Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (same); Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *10-11
(same); infra Part V (describing potential role of fairness and reasonableness considerations
in World Wide Web advertising cases).
232. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 104, 116-21 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing minimum contacts existed but that considerations of fair-
ness and reasonableness rendered exercise of jurisdiction unconstitutional) (joined by White,
Marshall, Blackmun, JJ.).
233. See 1 CASAD, supra note 16, § 2.04[2][e], at 2-97 n.269 (describing effect of and
judicial reaction to Asahl); Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 225-30 (describing lower court treat-
ment of Justice Brennan's and Justice O'Connor's opinions in Asahi).
234. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(analogizing between placement of products into stream of commerce and creation of adver-
tisement on World Wide Web), af4'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
235. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1116-17 (noting superficial similarities between stream
of commerce and World Wide Web).
236. See Stott, supra note 19, at 838-41 (describing differences between Internet stream
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A subtle yet important modification of Justice Brennan's approach by
the courts in Inset, CyberGold, and Granite Gate illustrates the profound
theoretical differences between World Wide Web advertising and placing
goods into the stream of commerce. Justice Brennan's stream of commerce
approach requires the defendant's actual knowledge that a product it placed
into the stream of commerce is marketed in the forum. 7 If a court cannot
determine that the defendant knew its products reached the forum, the court
cannot exercise jurisdiction.238 In contrast, the Inset, CyberGold, and
Granite Gate courts require only the defendant's knowledge that its World
Wide Web advertisement can reach forums where the World Wide Web
reaches.239
The substitution of actual awareness in the stream of commerce analysis
for constructive awareness in the World Wide Web advertising analysis is a
natural result of the difficulty advertisers face in determining who accesses
their advertisements on the World Wide Web. ° The World Wide Web
ignores physical geography as it brings information to users."I Although
some World Wide Web advertisers track usage of their World Wide Web
sites,U2 a threshold actual knowledge requirement would severely limit a
court's ability to reach many World Wide Web advertisers.
The relative predictability of the stream of commerce compared to the
relative unpredictability of the World Wide Web also weakens the applicabil-
ity of Justice Brennan's stream of commerce approach in World Wide Web
of commerce and regular stream of commerce).
237. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining actual awareness
requirement). InAsahi, Justice Brennan explained that due process is satisfied "[a]s long as
the participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum
State." Id.
238. Id.
239. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(explaining that "CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit advertising information to
all internet users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally"); Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding that "Instruction
has directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its toll-free number toward not only
the state of Connecticut, but to all states"); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-
7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *10 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (explaining that "[w]hen one
sets up and posts advertising information, one does everything necessary to reach the global
Internet audience"), at'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997).
240. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1112-15 (describing difficulty in identifying Internet
user's geographic location).
241. See Johnson & Post, supra note 27, at 1370-76 (describing Internet's insensitivity
to physical geography).
242. See Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *8-9 (describing defendants' efforts to track
users of its World Wide Web site).
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advertising cases. 243 In Asahi, Justice Brennan noted that "[t]he stream of
commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail
sale."244 Justice Brennan also noted that defendants who place products into
the stream of commerce receive economic and regulatory benefits from
forums where their products are sold, whether or not the defendant engages
in any additional conduct directed toward the forum. 5 In contrast, informa-
tion on the World Wide Web frequently reaches unknown or unanticipated
audiences because distribution depends, to a large extent, on the user's
request for information.' Less predictability in World Wide Web advertis-
ing means less foreseeability that World Wide Web advertisements will enter
the forum.247
In stream of commerce cases, Justice Brennan's standard gives manu-
facturers, distributors, and retailers the ability to alter their behavior while
remaining active participants in commerce.248 A manufacturer who places
products into the stream of commerce retains the ability to control the prod-
243. See Stott, supra note 19, at 839-41 (arguing Internet's worldwide reach gives
insufficient notice to advertisers and requires application of Justice O'Connor's additional
conduct standard rather than Justice Brennan's mere awareness standard in World Wide Web
advertising cases).
244. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 117 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
245. See id. (describing benefits received from forum). Lower courts have split over
which approach to follow after Asahi. See 1 CAsAD, supra note 16, § 2.04[2][e], at 2-97
n.269 (describing lower courts' treatment of Asahi); Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 225-30
(same).
246. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2343 (1997) (noting that Internet communica-
tions do not appear on users' screens unbidden); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing several affirmative steps required to access
defendant's World Wide Web advertisement), af'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir.
Sept. 10, 1997).
247. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(describing minimum contacts test's foreseeability requirement).
248. See id. at 297 (describing methods of avoiding burdens associated with personal
jurisdiction in particular forums when placing goods into stream of commerce), cited in Asahi,
480 U.S. at 118-19 (Brennan, J., concurring). World-Wide Volkswagen provided the doctrinal
foundation for Justice Brennan's opinion in Asahi. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 118-20 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen); Stephens, supra note 76, at 120-21
(discussing Justice Brennan's opinion in Asahi). In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court
explained the purpose of the purposeful availment requirement. World-ide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 297. The requirement gives the defendant "clear notice that it is subject to suit there,
and [it] can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing
the expected costs on to consumers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with
the State." Id.
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uct's distribution by entering into contracts that restrict the product's distri-
bution and sale in unfavorable forums.249 On the World Wide Web, the
same option is not available because the Internet's geographical insensitivity
combined with technological limits on screening devices render attempts to
control access to World Wide Web advertisements ineffectual or self-defeat-
ing.
250
World Wide Web advertisers have two choices if courts continue to
apply the mere placement test in World Wide Web advertising cases. First,
they can leave their advertisements on the World Wide Web and subject
themselves to findings of minimum contacts in every forum that applies the
mere placement test. 25 Second, they can remove their advertisement from
the World Wide Web if they wish to avoid jurisdiction in forums that apply
the mere placement test. Justice Brennan's mere awareness approach does
not require an all-or-nothing choice by participants in the stream of com-
merce. 2 2 A mere awareness approach should not be used to force such an
all-or-nothing choice by World Wide Web advertisers. 253 Courts need a
better standard for finding minimum contacts.254
249. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (describing actions manufacturer or
retailer can take to avoid purposefully availing itself of undesirable forums).
250. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-49 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (explaining diffi-
culty of restricting access to sexually explicit content on Internet and other computer
networks), af4'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. 160, 171, 183 (noting World Wide Web page owners cannot effectively restrict access
to their pages from particular forums); supra notes 133, 136 (discussing American Libraries
Ass'n).
251. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(applying mere placement test to exercise personal jurisdiction over World Wide Web
advertiser); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163-65 (D. Conn.
1996) (same); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *10
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (same), aff'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 5, 1997).
252. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1117 (arguing that Supreme Court's minimum contacts
jurisprudence does not support "all or nothing" approach to Internet-related exercises of
personal jurisdiction).
253. Cf. American Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 183 (declaring New York statute
restricting computer communications unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds). The
American Libraries Ass'n court explained that if the New York law were upheld "[t]he user
must thus comply with the regulation imposed by the state with the most stringent standard or
forego Internet communication of the message that might or might not subject her to prosecu-
tion." Id. The court cautioned: "Further development of the Internet requires that users be
able to predict the results of their Internet use with some degree of assurance." Id. The court
concluded: "The need for uniformity in this unique sphere of commerce requires that New
York's law be stricken as a violation of the Commerce Clause." Id.
254. See infra Part IV.C (suggesting flexible two-step approach for analyzing World
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2. The Additional Conduct Approach to World Wide Web
Advertising Contacts
Not all courts agree that the simple act of placing an advertisement on
the World Wide Web establishes minimum contacts wherever the World
Wide Web reaches. 5 In Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. King, 2 6 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York refused
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident World Wide Web adver-
tiser.25 The Bensusan court adopted a minimum contacts approach that
requires additional conduct by the defendant aimed at the forum before a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction."8 Although the court found it
Wide Web advertising contacts).
255. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that placement of advertisement on World Wide Web does not demonstrate purposeful
availment of forum), aft'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); see also
Weber v. Jolly Hotels, No. CIV. A. 96-2582, 1997 WL 574950, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Sept. 12,
1997) (finding Internet advertising does not establish purposeful availment); Graphic Controls
Corp. v. Utah Medical Prods., Inc., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232, at *3-4
(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 1997) (finding toll-free telephone number and information available on
Internet do not demonstrate purposeful availment of New York); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (exercising personal jurisdiction
over defendant, but noting passive World Wide Web advertisement alone does not establish
purposeful availment of forum). In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, a magistrate judge recom-
mended that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York refuse to
exercise jurisdiction over a New Jersey defendant who maintained a World Wide Web site that
was accessible in the forum. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP),
1997 WL 97097, at "20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (mag. j. report and recommendation).
The magistrate expressly refused to follow the Inset, CyberGold, and Heroes courts. See id.
(discussing Inset, CyberGold, and Heroes); see also Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F.
Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (weighing defendant's World Wide Web advertising contacts in
favor of minimum contacts finding, but basing exercise of personal jurisdiction on other
grounds); CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1333-34 (exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent World Wide Web advertiser); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161,
165 (D. Conn. 1996) (same). The magistrate cautioned against exercising "national (or even
worldwide) jurisdiction" based on World Wide Web advertising contacts absent "Congressio-
nal enactment of Internet specific trademark infringement personal jurisdiction legislation").
Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *20.
256. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
257. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over World Wide Web advertiser based on mere
placement of advertisement on World Wide Web), aft'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir.
Sept. 10, 1997).
258. See id. at 300 (adopting additional conduct approach). In Bensusan, the plaintiff
brought several trademark related claims against the nonresident World Wide Web advertiser,
including trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition. Id. at 298.
The court first determined that the defendant's World Wide Web advertising activities did not
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could not exercise personal jurisdiction under state law, it nevertheless
discussed due process limitations on its ability to reach the nonresident
World Wide Web advertiser.2 9 The Bensusan court's approach to weighing
World Wide Web advertising contacts bears a remarkable resemblance to the
additional conduct approach applied by Justice O'Connor in Asahi.260
This Section begins with a discussion of the facts and minimum contacts
analysis in Bensusan." I It then explains Justice O'Connor's additional
conduct standard.262 This Section concludes by arguing that the additional
conduct approach, like the mere placement approach applied in Inset,
CyberGold, and Granite Gate, is too rigid for constitutional application to
World Wide Web advertising contacts.2 3
a. The Additional Conduct Approach in Practice: Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King
Bensusan involved a trademark dispute between a New York nightclub
owner and a Missouri nightclub owner.' The Missouri defendant created
and maintained a World Wide Web site that advertised its club "The Blue
Note," and that contained references and links to the World Wide Web site
of the New York plaintiff's jazz club, also called "The Blue Note."2 5 The
satisfy the requirements of New York's long-arm statute. Id. at 299-300. The court then
found that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate the requirements of the Due Process
Clause because the mere act of creating a World Wide Web site, "like placing a product into
the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide - or even worldwide - but, without more,
it is not an act purposefully directed at the forum state." Id. at 301 (citing Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
259. See id. at 300 (noting that New York long-arm statute not authorize exercise of
jurisdiction and explaining Due Process Clause forbade exercise of jurisdiction).
260. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (requiring "additional conduct" directed at forum before placement of
goods into stream of commerce can establish minimum contacts), cited in Bensusan, 937 F.
Supp. at 301.
261. See infra Part IV.B.2.a (discussing Bensusan additional conduct approach).
262. See infra Part IV.B.2.b (describing Justice O'Connor's additional conduct approach
in Asahi).
263. See infra Part IV.B.2.c (arguing additional conduct approach is too inflexible for
consistently constitutional application of minimum contacts test).
264. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(explaining plaintiff's claims against defendant), aff'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir.
Sept. 10, 1997). The plaintiff asserted claims of trademark infringement, trademark dilution,
and unfair competition. Id.
265. See id. at 297-98 (describing defendant's World Wide Web site and plaintiff's and
defendant's nightclubs).
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owner of the New York club, who also owned the rights to the "Blue Note"
mark, brought suit.2 6
The Bensusan court began its minimum contacts analysis by noting that
the defendant's World Wide Web site constituted its only contact with New
York. 67 The plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendant encouraged
New Yorkers to access his site, nor any evidence that the defendant con-
ducted or solicited business in New York.2 8 Indeed, the evidence showed
that ninety-nine percent of the defendant's business was derived from the
area in and around Columbia, Missouri. 9
The Bensusan court implicitly rejected the mere placement approach.7
It found that the mere foreseeability that a defendant's World Wide Web site
might be accessed in the forum was insufficient to satisfy due process. 1
The court cited Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi to support its contention
that "[c]reating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce
may be felt nationwide - or even worldwide - but, without more, it is not
an act purposefully directed toward the forum state."'r The court also noted
that it takes several affirmative steps on the part of a World Wide Web user
to access a particular World Wide Web site.273 The Bensusan court would
require additional evidence that a defendant targeted the forum through the
World Wide Web before it would find minimum contacts.27 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
affirmed the district court's decision in Bensusan.275 Describing the district
court's opinion as "scholarly," the court of appeals noted the difficulty courts
266. See id. (describing plaintiff's suit).
267. See id. at 300-01 (describing defendant's contacts with forum).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 300 (describing defendant's affidavit).
270. Compare Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997) (refusing to find purposeful
availment of forum via World Wide Web advertisement), with Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding purposeful availment based in part
on defendant's World Wide Web advertisement).
271. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (explaining plaintiff's argument that foreseeabil-
ity of access creates minimum contacts falls short of due process requirements).
272. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
273. Id. at 299.
274. See id. (discussing absence of additional contacts between defendant and forum); see
also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-27 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(noting defendant's contacts above and beyond World Wide Web advertising contacts).
275. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10,
1997), aff'g, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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encounter when attempting to apply traditional legal rules to the Internet. 276
Despite this difficulty, the court of appeals agreed with the district court that
New York law did not allow the exercise of jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.' Because the court of appeals found New York law prohibited the
exercise of jurisdiction, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether
the exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process.27 This decision left
the district court's due process analysis intact. ' 9
b. Evolution From Justice O'Connor's Approach in
Stream of Commerce Cases
In Asahi, Justice O'Connor argued that a defendant's awareness that a
product it placed into the stream of commerce might or would enter the
forum was insufficient to demonstrate purposeful availment of that forum.28'
276. See id. at *2 (realizing that "attempting to apply established trademark law in the
fast-developing world of the internet is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus").
277. Id. The court of appeals noted that the plaintiff claimed "somewhat inconsistently"
that the district court could exercise jurisdiction under two provisions of New York's long-arm
statute. Id. The first long-arm provision invoked by the plaintiff allows courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over any person who commits a tortious act within the state. Id. The
court of appeals noted that all of the defendant's acts, including creation of the World Wide
Web site, use of the disputed marks, and creation of a link to the plaintiff's World Wide Web
site, were performed in Missouri. Id. at *4. The court explained that acts performed in
Missouri could not be used to prove a tortious act in New York. Id.
The second long-arm provision invoked by the plaintiff allows courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction in cases where a defendant commits a tortious act outside the state that causes
injury to persons or property in the state. Id. However, the court noted that the New York
legislature restricted this provision to those persons who "derive substantial revenue from
interstate commerce." Id. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments that the defendant's hiring
of nationally known bands and patronage by out-of-state students at the local university
satisfied this substantial revenue requirement. Id. Instead, the court of appeals found that
"King's 'Blue Note' cafe was unquestionably a local operation." Id.
278. Id. at *2.
279. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding due process prohibited exercise of personal jurisdiction), af4'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL
560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (discussing
district court's minimum contacts analysis). The Second Circuit's failure to reach the due
process issue leaves a split among the district courts within the Second Circuit concerning
whether a World Wide Web advertisement can establish purposeful availment. Compare Ben-
susan, 937 F. Supp. at 300-01 (refusing to find purposeful availment) and Graphic Controls
Corp. v. Utah Medical Prods., Inc., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL276232, at*3 (W.D.N.Y.
May 21, 1997) (same), with Inset Sys., Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165
(D. Conn. 1996) (concluding defendant purposefully availed itself of Connecticut).
280. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. at 102, 112 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that mere awareness is not enough to demon-
strate purposeful availment).
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She cited Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.28' and Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz28 to support her contention that mere placement of a product into
281. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (finding personal
jurisdiction over defendant that regularly circulated magazines in forum). In Hustler, a New
York plaintiff brought a libel suit against an Ohio publisher in New Hampshire based on the
contents of the defendant's magazine. Id. at 772. The statute of limitations had run in every
forum except New Hampshire and the plaintiff moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. Id. The district court and the court of appeals refused to find sufficient minimum
contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court
noted that the defendant sold ten thousand to fifteen thousand copies of Hustler in New
Hampshire each month. Id. The Court found that such contacts could not "by any stretch of
the imagination be characterized as random, isolated, or fortuitous." Id. at 774. The Court
also found that the defendant's continuous and deliberate exploitation of New Hampshire led
to a reasonable anticipation of "a libel action based on the contents of its magazine." Id. at
781. The Court rejected the need for minimum contacts between the plaintiff and the forum.
Id. at 779. Finally, the Court found that the defendant faced no unfairness in defending a suit
in a state where a substantial number of its magazines were sold and distributed. Id. at 781.
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's judgment. Id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
He argued that the regular circulation of magazines in the forum supported the exercise of
personal jurisdiction regardless of the forum's interest and its unique statute of limitations.
Id. Justice Brennan explained that the state's interests should only be considered as they bear
upon a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. Id. (citing Insurance Corp. of
Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10 (1982)).
282. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (concluding exercise
of personal jurisdiction over defendant satisfied due process). In Burger King, two Michigan
residents contracted with Florida restaurant-franchiser Burger King to open a restaurant in
Michigan. Id. at 466. The defendants applied to Burger King's district office, located in
Michigan, for the franchise and negotiated with both the district office and the home office
over the terms of the agreement. Id. at 466-67. When the deal soured, Burger King brought
suit in Florida on breach of contract and trademark infringement claims. Id. at 468-69. The
district court exercised personal jurisdiction; however, the court of appeals reversed. Id. at
469-70. Burger King appealed, and the Supreme Court found that the district court's exercise
of jurisdiction satisfied due process. Id. at 478. The Court noted that Rudzewicz deliberately
reached out beyond Michigan and entered into a long-term agreement with Burger King's
Florida headquarters. Id. at 479-80. The Court also noted that Rudzewicz accepted direction
and regulation from Burger King in Florida. Id. at 480. The Court dismissed the court of
appeals's reliance on Rudzewicz's dealings with Burger King's district office, noting a "sub-
stantial record... indicating that Rudzewicz most certainly knew that he was affiliating him-
self with an enterprise based primarily in Florida." Id. at 480. The court also relied on a
choice of law clause in the franchise documents that designated Florida law as the governing
law of the agreement. Id. at 481. Finally, the Court found no evidence of substantial unfair-
ness or unreasonableness in the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 482. The Court con-
cluded that the exercise of jurisdiction satisfied due process because the defendant established
a substantial and continuing relationship with the Florida plaintiff, received fair notice of the
possibility of suit, and failed to show unfairness in the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 487.
Justice Stevens dissented. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was unfair. Id. He noted that the defendant's
business was confined to Michigan and that most of his dealings were with the plaintiff's Mich-
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the stream of commerce without more does not create a "substantial connec-
tion" between the defendant and the forum.' Justice O'Connor argued that
purposeful availment in stream of commerce cases requires additional
conduct that demonstrates the defendant's intention to serve the forum
market.2' Sufficient additional conduct might include: "designing the
product for market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, estab-
lishing channels for providing regular advice to consumers in the forum
State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve
as a sales agent in the forum State."' Under Justice O'Connor's standard,
the absence of additional conduct prevents findings of purposeful availment
in stream of commerce cases.286
c. Difficulties in Applying the Additional Conduct Approach
The additional conduct approach certainly raises the level of contacts
required to show purposeful availment in World Wide Web advertising
cases.7 It removes the danger to advertisers that by simply placing an
advertisement on the World Wide Web they will create purposeful minimum
contacts with every forum the World Wide Web reaches. 2 8 However, the
Bensusan court's approach also creates constitutional problems because it
prevents the exercise of jurisdiction over advertisers who intend to reach
multiple forums, but who fail to target any forum in particular.8 9
igan office. Id. Justice Stevens criticized the majority for relying on "standard boilerplate
language contained in various documents" to find purposeful availment. Id. at 487-88. He
also quoted extensive portions of the court of appeals's opinion which had found that the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would offend fundamental fairness. Id. at 488-90.
283. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (explaining need for substantial connection between defendant and forum)
(citing Hustler, 465 U.S. at 774 and Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See id. (refusing to find purposeful availment in stream of commerce case absent
additional contacts by defendant).
287. Compare Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (requiring additional conduct between defendant and forum), a4"d, No. 1383, 1997 WL
560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997), with Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding purposeful availment based on mere placement of adver-
tisement on Internet).
288. See Kalow, supra note 19, at 2269-74 (discussing effect of additional conduct re-
quirement on application of minimum contacts test to World Wide Web advertising contacts).
289. Cf. Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 531, 532-33 (1995) (criticizing Justice O'Connor's Asahi opinion as
reducing stream of commerce "to a pathetic dribble").
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The Bensusan court's application of the additional conduct approach
prevents courts from finding minimum contacts between a World Wide Web
advertiser and a forum unless the plaintiff can present evidence that the
defendant "actively sought to encourage" forum residents to access its site
or otherwise derived measurable benefits from the forum through its World
Wide Web advertisement.2"° Some advertisers intend to avail themselves of
every forum the World Wide Web reaches though they specifically target
none.29" ' Courts need an approach that allows the exercise of jurisdiction
whenever a World Wide Web advertiser intends to receive the benefits and
protections of a forum, regardless of whether the defendant sought benefits
from other forums at the same time. 92
C. A Flexible Approach to Weighing World Wide Web
Advertising Contacts
The problems raised by both the mere placement standard and the
additional conduct standard demonstrate the critical need for a fresh ap-
proach to World Wide Web advertising contacts.293 This fresh approach
must recognize that some World Wide Web advertisers place advertisements
on the World Wide Web hoping to reach only a local audience.294 It must
290. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (explaining additional conduct standard in World
Wide Web advertising context).
291. See Silverman, supra note 62, at Cl (describing businesses with World Wide Web
"gold fever").
292. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (allowing the
exercise of personal jurisdiction when "the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activities
at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or
relate to' those activities" (citations omitted)).
293. Several commentators have suggested a variety of approaches for analyzing World
Wide Web and Internet contacts ranging from endorsement of Justice O'Connor's additional
conduct approach to proposals for fundamentally reworking or abandoning the International
Shoe minimum contacts test. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1118-20 (suggesting adoption of
minimum contacts analysis modeled after Judge Learned Hand's Carroll Towing analysis for
determining foreseeable consequences); Kalow, supra note 19, at 2269-74 (arguing courts
should adopt Justice O'Connor's approach in Asaht); Stott, supra note 19, at 854 (endorsing
application of Justice O'Connor's approach to World Wide Web advertising contacts);
Swedlow, supra note 19, at 384 (proposing "Model Rule for Internet Contact Determination");
Thatch, supra note 19, at 174-77 (suggesting application of Justice Stevens's approach in
Asahi); Zembek, supra note 146, at 367-80 (suggesting adoption of analogies to minimum
contacts analysis in advertising, telephone, and environmental cases).
294. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing World Wide Web advertisement for nightclub that drew ninety-nine percent of its
business from surrounding community), af'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10,
1997).
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also recognize that other World Wide Web advertisers place advertisements
on the World Wide Web hoping to reach distant forums.295 This fresh ap-
proach must account for the fact that some advertisements are generic with no
specific target.2" It must also account for the fact that some advertisements
are specific and targeted. 297 Flexibility is the key to a minimum contacts
analysis of World Wide Web advertising contacts that satisfies due process.29
At least one court understands the complexities involved in applying the
minimum contacts test to contacts made through the World Wide Web.29" This
Section begins with a discussion of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Z'ppo Dot
Com,3" where the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania developed a sliding scale for measuring the quality of contacts
made through the Internet, the World Wide Web, and other electronic forms
of communication."° This Section continues with a discussion of the founda-
tional principles for development of a flexible analysis of World Wide Web
advertising contacts. It concludes with an analysis of CyberGold, Bensusan,
and Granite Gate under a proposed two-step minimum contacts analysis.
295. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(describing World Wide Web advertiser who sought customers across World Wide Web).
296. See supra Part II.B (describing basic World Wide Web advertisement).
297. See supra Part ILB.1 (describing targeted World Wide Web advertisement).
298. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (finding due
process depends "upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the process of the due process clause to insure"). The
Court explained "that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative." Id.
299. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123-25 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (explaining various levels of Internet and World Wide Web contacts).
300. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
301. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident Internet news service after weighing contacts
on sliding scale); see infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing Zippo). In Zippo, the court exercised
jurisdiction under the provision of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute that authorizes the
exercise of jurisdiction over defendants who contract "to supply services or things in this
state." Zippo, 947 F. Supp. at 1122. The court also noted that the state's long-arm statute
allowed the court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Constitu-
tion. Id. The court determined that the defendant's activities, which included entering into
contracts with forum residents through the Internet, established the propriety of exercising
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1125-26. The court also found that the cause of action arose from
the defendant's conduct because "a cause of action for trademark infringement occurs where
the passing off occurs." Id. at 1127 (quoting Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Martino,
36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994)). Finally, the court determined that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion was not unreasonable. Id.
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1. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.:
A Recognition of the World Wide Web's Diversity
Zippo involved trademark infringement claims brought by the manufac-
turer of Zippo brand lighters against an Internet news service."° The defen-
dant maintained a World Wide Web site which advertised its news service. 3
In addition to its advertising contacts, the defendant had contracts with three
thousand subscribers in Pennsylvania and with seven Internet access providers
in Pennsylvania.3° The district court exercised personal jurisdiction and
explained that the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent commercial Internet users is "directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. 
305
Unsurprisingly, the court found the more commercial activity a defendant
conducts, the greater the ability of a court to exercise personal jurisdiction. 306
The Zippo court properly recognized that the key to a constitutionally sound
analysis of Internet-related contacts depends on the quality and nature of the
defendant's Internet-related activities.3 7
The Zippo court divided commercial Internet use into three categories:
passive World Wide Web sites, interactive World Wide Web sites, and
electronic contracts between residents of different forums. 308  The court
explained that "passive" World Wide Web sites that simply display informa-
tion do not establish minimum contacts between the defendant and the
forum. 3°  On the opposite end of the sliding scale, the court found that
defendants who reach out into other forums and knowingly enter into contracts
with residents in these forums subject themselves to the possibility of suits in
those forums.3 10 Finally, the court noted that a grey area exists between the
302. See Zippo, 947 F. Supp. at 1121 (describing parties to suit).
303. See id. (describing defendant's news service).
304. See id. (discussing defendant's customer base and contractual arrangements with
Pennsylvania residents).
305. Id. at 1124.
306. See id. (adopting sliding scale for measuring Internet contacts).
307. See id. at 1127 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)).
308. See id. (describing three categories of Internet contacts).
309. See id. (describing passive World Wide Web site as insufficient basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction). The ZOppo court described the defendant's World Wide Web site in
Bensusan as a passive World Wide Web site. Id. (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
310. See id. (explaining effect of electronic contacts between contracting parties); see also
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263-67 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing defen-
dant's purposeful availment based in part on online contracts).
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passive World Wide Web site and the electronic contract."' In this middle
ground the court explained that the constitutionality of an exercise of juris-
diction "is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site. 
3 12
The Zippo court took a step in the right direction when it recognized
that a constitutional analysis of Internet contacts depends on the quality and
nature of the defendant's Internet activities. 13 However, Zippo did not step
far enough. This Note has focused on World Wide Web sites that provide
advertising information to consumers. According to the Zippo court, these
kind of World Wide Web sites are passive sites that do not support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction, unless they possess special features which
make them "interactive."3 1 4 However, just as the Internet hosts different
levels of commercial activity, passive World Wide Web advertisements can
create different levels of contacts that, in some cases, support the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.
2. Foundational Principles for a Flexible Analysis of World Wide Web
Advertising Contacts
The World Wide Web's flexibility, low cost of entry, and ease of use
encourages advertisers from a variety of businesses to advertise on the World
Wide Web.315 The types of businesses range from software developmen 16
to legal services31 7 to cults. 1 The size of the businesses range from Mid-
311. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (describing middle ground where user can interact with host computer). The Zippo
court described defendant's World Wide Web site in CyberGold which requested information
from users as an interactive World Wide Web site. Id.; see Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (describing defendant's World Wide Web advertis-
ing activities).
312. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
313. Id. at 1127 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)).
314. See id. at 1124 (explaining that passive World Wide Web sites do not support
exercise of personal jurisdiction).
315. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing World
Wide Web's flexibility, ease of use, and low cost of entry), 4'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997);
Ziegler, supra note 55, at B1 (describing early commercial World Wide Web sites).
316. Welcome to Microsoft (visited Sept. 8, 1997) <http://www.microsoft.com>.
317. Proskauer Rose LLP (visited Sept. 8, 1997) <http://www.proskauer.com>.
318. Heaven's Gate - How and When It May Be Entered (visited Sept. 8, 1997)
< http:l/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/digest/daily/march/27/cultsite>; see Silverman,
supra note 62, at Cl (describing wide variety of World Wide Web advertisers and advertise-
ments).
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western farm markets to multinational corporations." 9 Some of the busi-
nesses operate entirely on the World Wide Web and the Internet. 320 Others
advertise on the World Wide Web and encourage the viewer to come to the
advertiser's local outlet, store, or nightclub. 321 The markets World Wide
Web advertisers intend to reach range from the surrounding neighborhood
to the neighborhood of the World Wide Web itself.3 The minimum con-
tacts analysis must account for these variations.3z
a. Critical Factors that Demonstrate a World Wide Web Advertiser's
Intent and Reasonable Expectations
A variety of factors can help courts determine whether an advertiser
availed itself of a particular forum through the use of the World Wide
Web.324 Because all advertisements are directed at an audience, the content
of an advertisement gives some indication of the audience the advertiser
has attempted to reach. 32' For example, a neighborhood bookstore that
posts a World Wide Wide advertisement that advertises an upcoming book
signing by a local author probably does not intend or expect to reach other
319. See James Morris-Lee, Farmers Grow Customers on the World Wide Web, DIRECT
MKTG., July 1, 1996, at 14, 15 (describing World Wide Web fresh produce advertisement);
Taylor, supra note 55, at 9 (describing Coca-Cola's World Wide Web site).
320. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(describing defendant's World Wide Web advertisement which advertised its World Wide Web
advertising service).
321. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing defendant's advertisement of Missouri nightclub), aff'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL
560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997). The Second Circuit described the defendant's business as
"unquestionably a local operation." Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, No. 1383, 1997 WL
560048, at *4 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
322. Compare Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300-01 (finding no purposeful availment of
foreign forum), with CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1334 (finding purposeful availment of
foreign forum).
323. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (explaining
whether due process is satisfied depends on quality and nature of defendant's contacts with
forum).
324. See Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 230-34 (arguing that general advertising methods
and practices provide evidence of forums advertisers intend or expect to reach); Edward
Brodsky, Solicitation Via the Internet, N.Y.L.J, June 11, 1997, at 3 (discussing factors
including content of World Wide Web advertisement, disclaimers, and attempts to restrict
access that should influence personal jurisdiction analysis).
325. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion) (explaining that advertisements directed at forum can support finding of
purposeful availment in stream of commerce cases). But see Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 234
(noting courts often fail to consider which forums advertisers actually target).
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forums. 3" In contrast, an online book store with no physical retail outlets
that advertises a variety of books that it will ship across the United States
probably intends and should reasonably expect to reach every forum its
advertisement reaches.3 27 The content of the two advertisements suggests
that one advertiser is using a worldwide medium to reach a local audience
while the other advertiser is using a worldwide medium to reach customers
worldwide. A defendant advertiser could overcome a finding of purposeful
availment based on the content of its advertisement by providing specific
evidence that indicated it was not attempting to avail itself of a particular
forum.3" Likewise, a plaintiff could overcome a finding of no purposeful
availment by providing additional evidence that indicated the advertiser was
actually attempting to avail itself of the benefits and protections of the
forum.
329
The structure and location of a World Wide Web advertisement provide
additional clues concerning the advertiser's intent and reasonable expecta-
tions. World Wide Web advertisers have a variety of tools at their disposal
for crafting unique World Wide Web advertisements.330 Some advertisers
craft basic World Wide Web pages without a specific target.3 Other
advertisers target specific markets and tailor advertisements to appeal to
certain market segments. 32 For example, a national advertiser who places
banner advertisements Oinked to its World Wide Web site) for snow blowers
on a weather map of Michigan in January provides a clear indication that it
is attempting to reach Michigan residents.333 Finally, while the content and
326. Cf. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300 (describing defendant's advertisement of local
nightclub).
327. Cf. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(describing defendant's World Wide Web advertisement which advertised its World Wide Web
advertising service).
328. C. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing defendant's affidavit). The defendant submitted an affidavit which indicated that
ninety-nine percent of his business was derived within the forum and that most of his interstate
income derived from customers who had a pre-existing connection to the area. Id. at 300.
Evidence of this kind is helpful in showing that the defendant was not attempting to reach
every forum reached by the World Wide Web.
329. See Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 230-34 (encouraging plaintiffs to examine defen-
dant's efforts to examine marketing, demographics, reach, coverage, and target of advertis-
ing); supra Part II.B (discussing World Wide Web advertising practices and methods).
330. See supra Part II.B (describing variety of tools at advertisers' disposal).
331. See supra Part ll.B (describing basic World Wide Web advertisements).
332. See supra Parts II.B.1 & 2 (describing targeting and tailoring of World Wide Web
advertisements).
333. See Quittner, supra note 72, at 34 (discussing Thme's Pathfinder online service's use
1328
JURISDICTIONAROUND THE WHOLE WIDE WORLD?
structure of World Wide Web advertisements provide important evidence for
the minimum contacts analysis, additional evidence including business and
marketing plans, public statements and disclosures, and information concern-
ing the defendant's traditional markets can provide clues to the advertiser's
intent and reasonable expectations."
b. Standards for Measuring a World Wide Web Advertiser's Contacts
The variety of possible contacts between an advertiser and a forum
requires courts to analyze each case on its own facts.335 Unfortunately, the
prophylactic rules of the mere placement test and of the additional conduct
test are too inflexible for consistent constitutional application.33 6 Strict
application of the mere placement approach could allow the exercise of
jurisdiction over an advertiser who derived ninety-nine percent of its busi-
ness from within its home state.337 Strict application of the Bensusan ap-
proach could prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over an advertiser who used
the World Wide Web in the hopes of reaching customers located throughout
the United States unless the advertiser directed its activities at particular
forums.338 Constitutional application of the minimum contacts test demands
of targeted advertisements from third-party companies).
334. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(observing limited extent of defendant's market), aff'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir.
Sept. 10, 1997); Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1988)
(finding advertising in nationally circulated trade magazine insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction). In Lake Havasu, the court noted that the defendant concentrated its sales in
Arizona and California and advertised in a nationally circulated trade magazine to promote
those forum-specific sales. Id. at 4243. The court found the mere act of advertising in a
national trade journal did not establish purposeful availment of Minnesota. Id. at 43; see also
Zbaracki, supra note 68, at 230-34 (describing how marketing, demographic analysis, and
reach of advertising can help courts determine whether defendant directed advertising at
forum).
335. See Silverman, supra note 62, at Cl (describing variety of potential World Wide
Web advertising contacts).
336. See supra Parts IV.B.1.c & 2.c (describing inflexibility of additional conduct and
mere placement approaches).
337. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant based on mere placement of
advertisement on World Wide Web); Burk, supra note 23, at 1111 n.70 (noting that Inset
opinion's logic could support proposition that all World Wide Web site owners have availed
themselves of Connecticut "even if they have never heard of Connecticut"); supra Part
IV.B. 1.a.i (discussing Inset).
338. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300-01 (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendant absent additional conduct targeting forum); see supra Part
IV.B.2.a (discussing Bensusan approach).
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that courts retain the flexibility to exercise personal jurisdiction over those
defendants who purposefully avail themselves of the forum, while denying
requests for jurisdiction over defendants whose advertisements fortuitously
reach the forum. 9
Courts should apply a flexible two-step approach for determining
whether a World Wide Web advertiser has established purposeful contacts
with a forum. The court should first determine whether the content of the
World Wide Web advertisement indicates an intent to reach forum
residents." If the content of the advertisement indicates an intent to serve
the forum, the court should determine whether other factors such as the
traditional reach of the defendant's business mitigate or aggravate the intent
demonstrated by the content of the advertisement."' Once the court applies
this two-step minimum contacts approach and determines that the defendant
intended or should have reasonably expected to reach the forum, it remains
free to refuse to exercise jurisdiction on fairness and reasonableness
grounds. 2
3. Reappraisal of CyberGold, Granite Gate, and Bensusan Under the
Flexible Two-Step Minimum Contacts Approach
Although the approaches adopted by the Inset, CyberGold, Bensusan,
and Granite Gate courts are too inflexible for consistent application to World
Wide Web advertising contacts, the inflexibility of their approaches does not
necessarily invalidate their holdings. Unfortunately, the few facts provided
by the Inset court prevents a final judgment on the constitutionality of its
decision.343 However, the facts as described in CyberGold, Bensusan, and
339. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-75 (1985) (finding due
process allows exercise of jurisdiction when defendant "purposefully directs" activities at
forum, but forbids exercise of jurisdiction based on fortuitous contacts).
340. See supra Part IV.C.2.a (discussing importance of advertisement's content and
structure in minimum contacts analysis).
341. See supra Part IV.C.2.a (describing factors beyond mere content and form of
advertisement relevant to minimum contacts analysis of World Wide Web advertising con-
tacts).
342. See infra Part V (discussing application of fairness and reasonableness considerations
in World Wide Web advertising cases).
343. See supra Part IV.B.l.a.i (discussing Inset). The Inset court noted that the defen-
dant, which provided computer technology and support to thousands of organizations around
the world, used its advertisement to advertise its goods and services. Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162-63 (D. Conn. 1996). These facts seem to indicate
that step one of the flexible approach to World Wide Web advertising contacts is satisfied.
However, the court provides no information on the content of the advertisement that would
indicate which markets, if any, the defendant had targeted through its advertisement. This
failure makes a final conclusion on the constitutionality of the court's decision inadvisable.
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Granite Gate suggest that those courts reached constitutional minimum
contacts conclusions."
a. Step One: The Advertiser's Objective Intent
The first step for any court evaluating the propriety of finding minimum
contacts in World Wide Web advertising cases should be the objective
evidence provided by the content of the advertisement itself.345 The defen-
dants in both CyberGold and Granite Gate created World Wide Web adver-
tisements that appeared to be directed at a nationwide audience. 3 1 Cyber-
Gold's entire business depended on reaching across the World Wide Web to
enroll participants in its World Wide Web advertising service.3 47 Likewise,
in Granite Gate the defendants' advertisement boasted that the defendants'
gambling service allowed betting from anywhere around the world. 48 In
contrast, the Bensusan court noted that the defendant's Missouri nightclub
advertisement was a general access site, contained general information about
the Missouri club, and provided information on obtaining tickets for the
Missouri club's shows.3 49 Although the content of the CyberGold and
Granite Gate sites demonstrated the advertisers' intent to reach distant
forums, the Bensusan site demonstrated the advertiser's intent to reach a
local market.
b. Step Two: Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
The second step in the flexible minimum contacts analysis allows courts
to look behind the advertisement to determine an advertiser's intent and
reasonable expectationsY.3  Again, the facts from CyberGold, Granite Gate,
and Bensusan indicate that those courts came to the constitutionally correct
344. See supra Part IV.B.l.a.ii (discussing CyberGold); supra Part IV.B.l.a.iii (discuss-
ing Granite Gate); supra Part IV.B.2.a (discussing Bensusan).
345. See supra Part IV.C.2.a (discussing importance of advertisement's content and form
in minimum contacts analysis).
346. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330, 1333 (describing
CyberGold's World Wide Web site); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227,
1996 WL 767431, at *4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (describing content of defendants'
World Wide Web site), aft'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5,
1997).
347. CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
348. Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *4.
349. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing content of defendant's World Wide Web site), aft'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048
(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
350. See supra Part IV.C.2 (describing factors beyond mere content and form of adver-
tisement relevant to minimum contacts analysis).
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conclusions. In CyberGold and Granite Gate the defendants were unable to
overcome the objective evidence that they aimed their advertisement at every
forum the World Wide Web reaches.351 In Bensusan, the plaintiff was
unable to demonstrate that the defendant was attempting to reach out beyond
an essentially local market. 52
In CyberGold, the defendant merely argued that it had established a
World Wide Web site with which it intended to reach Internet users regard-
less of geographic location.5 The defendant was unable to show that it did
not intend to reach Missouri internet users. Demonstrating disinterest in
where one's customers live is not equivalent to demonstrating one did not
purposefully avail oneself of a particular forum.
In Granite Gate, the district court pointed to several factors, including
mailing lists, site usage logs, and telephone conversations, which established
that the defendants knew or should have known that they had established
contacts with Minnesota.354 As in CyberGold, the Granite Gate defendants
also argued that they had not availed themselves of any forum in particu-
lar.355 Neither the state district court nor the court of appeals allowed this
argument to overcome ample evidence that the advertisers attempted to reach
the forum with the expectation of receiving benefits from the forum.356
In Bensusan, the weight of the evidence certainly weighed against the
plaintiff. The defendant provided ample evidence of the essentially local
character of its business.357 The plaintiff failed to overcome this evidence
with evidence of its own that established the defendant had suddenly decided
to reach out to potential customers in New York. 358 The court's refusal to
find minimum contacts was constitutionally proper.
351. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (describing content of World Wide
Web sites in CyberGold and Granite Gate).
352. See supra note 349 and accompanying text (describing content of World Wide Web
site in Bensusan).
353. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
354. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *2-6
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996) (describing evidence of connection between defendants and
forum), aff'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997); State v.
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670, at *1-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept.
5, 1997) (same).
355. Granite Gate, i997 WL 557670, at *4.
356. Id. at *4-5.
357. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing defendant's affidavit that claimed ninety-nine percent of defendant's business was
derived locally), aft'd, No. 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
358. See id. at 301 (noting absence of evidence plaintiff availed himself of benefits and
protections of forum).
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V. Fairness and Reasonableness Considerations in World Wide
Web Advertising Cases
The precise role of the fairness and reasonableness considerations in
World Wide Web advertising cases remains uncertain. Although one court
has recently refused to exercise personal jurisdiction based on fairness and
reasonableness grounds,"' the discussion of these considerations in other
World Wide Web advertising cases has been limited.3" The district court's
finding of no minimum contacts in Bensusan made analysis of fairness and
reasonableness considerations unnecessary.36' In addition, none of the
defendants in CyberGold, Granite Gate, or Inset presented compelling cases
of unfairness or unreasonableness.362
359. See Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, at *2-5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997) (finding minimum contacts between defendant and forum but
refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction on fairness and reasonableness grounds). In Expert
Pages, California plaintiffs asked the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a Virginia
defendant who allegedly copied and posted portions of the plaintiffs' World Wide Web site.
Id. at *1. The plaintiffs maintained a World Wide Web advertising site that provided
information on expert witnesses and consultants. Id. The defendant, whom the court
described as a "young adult," allegedly copied the plaintiff's World Wide Web site. Id. The
defendant also allegedly sent disparaging e-mail messages to advertisers on the plaintiffs' site
for the purpose of promoting the defendant's own services. Id. The court found the act of
copying the plaintiffs World Wide Web site constituted an act directed at the forum and
calculated to cause injury in the forum. Id. at *3. The court found that this act established
minimum contacts with forum. Id. However, the court refused to exercise jurisdiction
because it found the burden on the defendant to be "very substantial" and because the contacts
between the defendant and the forum were "barely greater than the constitutional threshold."
Id. at *4-5.
360. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300-01 (skipping discussion of fairness and reason-
ableness after finding no purposeful availment); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp.
1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (discussing fairness and reasonableness briefly); Inset Sys., Inc.
v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (discussing fair play and
substantial justice briefly); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL
767431, at *11 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (describing exercise of personal jurisdiction
as fair and reasonable), 4'd, No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5,
1997). But see Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 470-71 (D.
Mass. 1997) (discussing fairness and reasonableness factors in case involving defendant who,
inter alia, allegedly breached licensing agreement and infringed plaintiff's trademarks via
defendant's World Wide Web site).
361. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300-01 (discussing due process limits on exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident World Wide Web advertiser).
362. See CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. at 1334 (noting forum's strong interest in resolving
trademark infringement matter affecting local corporation, plaintiff's strong interest in
adjudicating dispute in forum, and California defendant's failure to show excessive burden);
Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (noting forum's interest in adjudicating dispute, forum's ability to
dispose of matter efficiently, and close proximity between Massachusetts defendant and
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Although detailed discussion of the impact of fairness and reasonable-
ness considerations in World Wide Web advertising cases should wait for
fuller development by the courts, the outlines of the likely arguments can be
traced. Arguments concerning the burden on the defendant and the plain-
tiff's interest in convenient and effective relief will likely be substantially
unchanged in World Wide Web advertising cases. 63 However, important
differences should appear concerning the forum state's interest in adjudicat-
ing the dispute, the interstate judicial system's interest in providing conve-
nient and effective relief, and the shared interests of the several states in
furthering substantive social policies.3"
Courts can expect defendants in World Wide Web advertising cases to
argue that the exercise of jurisdiction in the forum presents an undue
burden.3" Plaintiffs will argue that they need the forum to exercise jurisdic-
tion in order to obtain convenient and effective relief.3"6 These arguments
are likely to come with greater frequency because the World Wide Web
eases interstate and international communication367 without improving
interstate transportation.3 6 8 However, the arguments will not differ substan-
tially from the same arguments in more traditional personal jurisdiction
cases.
369
Conflicts caused by competing attempts to control both the Internet and
its users may give increased weight to the remaining fairness and reasonable-
Connecticut forum); Granite Gate, 1996 WL 767431, at *11 (noting forum's interest in
adjudicating dispute and lack of inconvenience to Nevada defendant).
363. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (listing
fairness and reasonableness considerations); Expert Pages, 1997 WL 488011, at *3-4 (apply-
ing fairness and reasonableness considerations in World Wide Web advertising-related case).
364. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (listing fairness and reasonableness
considerations).
365. Compare CyberGold, 937 F. Supp. at 1334 (finding exercise of jurisdiction would
not impose undue burden), with Expert Pages, 1997 WL 488011, at *5 (finding exercise of
jurisdiction would impose undue burden).
366. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *11
(describing attorney general's interest in enforcing state's consumer protection laws), 4f'd,
No. C6-97-89, 1997 WL 557670 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997).
367. See Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(noting effect of Internet on communication).
368. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (explaining
improvements in modern communications technology and transportation allow expansion of
scope of personal jurisdiction). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1958)
(noting that expansion of scope of personal jurisdiction based on convenience does not remove
all restrictions on ability of courts to exercise personal jurisdiction under Due Process Clause).
369. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987) (explain-
ing and applying fairness and reasonableness considerations in stream of commerce case).
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ness considerations.370 Although each forum retains an interest in regulating
conduct that affects the state and its citizens, the several states and nations
also retain an interest in both the free flow of commerce on the Internet and
its World Wide Web, and in the regulation of their own citizens' activities.3 17
Striking a balance between the state's interest in regulating conduct that
affects its citizens and the national and international interest in growth and
expansion of the Internet and Internet commerce will be critical to future
development of the Internet and its World Wide Web.3r7
If courts extend their long-arm too far, they may unduly restrict the
World Wide Web's growth by discouraging advertisers from availing them-
selves of the World Wide Web's global commercial opportunities because of
fears of litigation in distant jurisdictions.3n Courts need an efficient and fair
mechanism for resolution of disputes arising from commercial use of the
Internet and World Wide Web374 that does not unduly restrict commerce on
the World Wide Web.3 75 Thus, courts should carefully consider the balance
between the forum's interest, national interests, and international interests in
future cases involving allegations of personal jurisdiction arising from
contacts made over the World Wide Web.
37 6
V. Conclusion
Although disputes arising from World Wide Web advertising must be
resolved somewhere, it is unnecessary and unwise for the courts to adopt an
370. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (listing
fairness and reasonableness considerations). The remaining considerations include the forum
state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the interstate judicial system's interest in the
efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interests of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies. Id.
371. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1095-96 (discussing constitutional issues raised by local
regulatory leakage); supra note 27 (discussing attempts to regulate Internet).
372. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2351 (1997) (finding government regulation
of content of speech on Internet more likely to interfere with than to encourage future growth);
see also Johnson & Post, supra note 27, at 1370-76 (striking balance in favor of creation of
new jurisdiction - Cyberspace - with its own laws and governing bodies).
373. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1117 (describing all or nothing choice of World Wide
Web users concerned about potential liability).
374. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (noting interstate judicial system's
interest in mechanism for efficient resolution of controversies).
375. See Burk, supra note 23, at 1117-23 (discussing need for sensible jurisdictional
regime).
376. C. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that although "Internet deserves special protection as a place where
public discourse may be conducted without regard to nationality, religion, sex, [or] age"
protection "does not extend to ignoring court orders and injunctions").
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inflexible approach to jurisdictional questions involving the World Wide
Web.' The great changes brought by the Internet and the World Wide Web
demand cautious handling by the courts.378 The Clinton Administration has
adopted a hands-off approach to the Internet to avoid stunting its natural
growth,379 and the Supreme Court has rebuffed early efforts to control
Internet content.
380
A flexible approach to analysis of World Wide Web advertising contacts
will serve the courts well as the World Wide Web and World Wide Web
advertising contacts change over time. 38  A flexible approach will allow
courts to reach defendants who purposefully direct their activities toward the
forum, while preventing courts from reaching defendants who fortuitously
contact the forum.su In addition, a flexible approach will serve advertisers
well by allowing them to structure their advertisements so as to avoid the
exercise of jurisdiction in forums they do not wish to reach. 3' Finally, a
flexible approach will ensure that the International Shoe minimum contacts
test remains the constitutional measure of the weight and quality of World
Wide Web advertising contacts.
31
377. Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2385 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) (explaining changing state of telecommunications
technology made adoption of inflexible analogies for First Amendment analysis of Cable
Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of 1992 "unwise and unnecessary").
378. See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(warning "[h]aphazard and uncoordinated state regulation can only frustrate the growth of
cyberspace").
379. See Jube Shiver, Jr. & Greg Miller, Clinton Vows No New Taxes on Internet, L.A.
TIMES, July 2, 1997, at D1 (describing Clinton Administration's "hands off" Internet policy).
380. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (declaring key provisions of
Communication Decency Act of 1996 unconstitutional); see also American Libraries Ass'n,
969 F. Supp. at 183-84 (enjoining enforcement of New York statute - designed to regulate
speech on Internet and other computer communications networks - on Commerce Clause
grounds).
381. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV.
4, 32 (1996) (noting wisdom of decisional minimalism in cases where rapid technological
change may change nature of problem or provide new opportunities).
382. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (requiring purpose-
ful direction of activities by plaintiff before exercise of jurisdiction is permissible).
383. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(explaining that corporation can sever connection with forum if risks of litigation arising from
placement of products into stream of commerce prove too high).
384. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (explaining the exercises of
jurisdiction must meet "the standards set forth by International Shoe and its progeny").
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